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Abstract 
This project aims at analysing how the concepts of truth, justice and reconciliation are deployed 
in post-conflict societies through Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs). As a part of 
their respective peace agreements at the end of their civil wars, Sierra Leone and Liberia have 
each established a TRC with the similar official purposes of uncovering past atrocities and 
reconciling their populations. Therefore, we conducted a comparative analysis of the Liberian 
and Sierra Leonean TRCs, which showed that the formations of the TRCs in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone played out in similar manners. However, the two TRC’s addressed justice in different 
ways, partially due to the context of other transitional justice mechanisms present in the two 
countries. Moreover, the project found that the working processes of the commissions did not 
produce objective truths about past violent conflicts, while reconciliation had different 
meanings, as seen observed in public hearings held by the TRCs. Furthermore, the project found 
that the recommendations of the two TRCs were politicised and contested, which questions the 
ability of the TRCs to promote reconciliation on a national level. 
The main finding of the project is that the concept of truth, justice and reconciliation play out 
differently in the cases of the two TRCs due to their national contexts, although they have 
similar objectives and were established in two post-conflict societies with similar conflict 
trajectories. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
This project springs out of an immediate interest in how people manage to live side by side in 
countries that have been affected by years of violent conflict and horrific atrocities. Before starting 
our research we asked: how do processes of reconciliation within these societies play out? One could 
assume that the quest for consolidating peace must be the overarching issue in any post-conflict 
society. However, peace might be very difficult to maintain if not the truth about the past and issues 
of justice are treated. In this sense, this project is based on a motivation to examine attempts of 
promoting reconciliation in the aftermath of violent conflicts. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, and to a greater extent in the 1990s, there has been a significant 
increase in post-conflict countries employing so-called truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) 
with the purpose of processing violent pasts and by that foster national reconciliation (Mark 
Freeman, 2005). The mandate of these commissions is typically to uncover the “truth” about gross 
human rights violations, which have occurred during a certain period of time in a given country – 
usually under previous regime or in relation to a particular conflict (ibid). Through this truth-seeking 
process, TRCs wish to promote national reconciliation within the population to consolidate peace in 
post-conflict countries. TRCs do not have the mandate to prosecute perpetrators, but can often 
recommend amnesty to perpetrators in return of total confession. Therefore, the relationship between 
justice and truth in the work of TRCs is widely discussed. Some have claimed that commissions 
might impede accountability by not bringing about judicial action. Tanya Goodman (2009) has 
argued that truth and reconciliation commissions should be understood in the greater context of an 
increasing international focus on processes of transitional justice in post-conflict societies, which is 
largely influenced by the prevailing human rights discourse. While six TRCs were established in the 
1970-1980s, the 1990s counted fourteen, including the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, which was acknowledged internationally and eventually came to serve as a template 
for TRCs in countries trying to process a violent past. Consequently, the increasing number of TRCs 
attests to the fact that TRCs are becoming more and more acknowledged as a transitional justice 
instrument (Priscilla Hayner, 1996). 
In this context, we wish to investigate post-conflict countries’ efforts to promote national 
reconciliation and found great interest in exploring Liberia and Sierra Leone. While the two Liberian 
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Civil Wars (1989-2003) led to more than 250.000 casualties as well as the displacement on almost 1 
million people, the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002) resulted in approximately 70.000 casualties 
and 2.6 million displaced people (UN Foundation, 2013; UNDP, 2006). The countries’ civil wars 
have been described as to some extent intertwined, given that various warring factions moved across 
borders and implicitly played a role in the dynamics of both wars. Additionally, conflict events in 
one of the countries would influence that of the other and cause further instability, and some have 
argued that the Sierra Leonean conflict emerged partially due to a spill over effect of the Liberian 
civil war (Earl Conteh-Morgan, 2006). 
Sierra Leone and Liberia both established a truth and reconciliation commission as a part of their 
peace-agreements at the end of their respective civil wars. Interestingly, the two TRCs were 
officially set up with relatively similar mandates to impartially uncover human rights violations 
during the past civil wars. This made us curious to whether there would be a common pattern in how 
these two TRCs would approach their histories of conflict. Furthermore, we wondered whether there 
were differences in their establishment, working processes and the public’s interest in the 
commissions depending on the countries’ different contexts, although the two countries have had 
somewhat similar histories.  
 
Problem Field 
Based on these preliminary observations, we wish to conduct a comparison of the two TRCs with the 
intension of examining broader patterns in the general work of TRCs, but also identify more specific 
differences in the contextual approaches to the concepts of truth, justice and reconciliation. We will 
explore how the three concepts are deployed differently and similarly in the Sierra Leonean and 
Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and whether it is possible to identify certain 
patterns in the commissions’ proceedings. Consequently, we have identified and selected three levels 
of analysis for comparing how the concepts play out in the two TRCs, namely through their 
formation and establishment; their working processes and the recommendations in the two 
commissions’ final reports to the respective governments. We have identified a time frame for our 
analysis, which runs from the establishment of the first of the two commissions, the Truth and 
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Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone in 1999, and up until present time, given that the 
implementations of the two reports’ recommendations are still debated and therefore relevant. 
Firstly, it has become evident that we need to compare the establishments and mandates of the two 
TRCs as this laid the premises and foundation for the two commissions’ following procedures. 
Through such a comparison we can identify how the three concepts unfold differently in the two 
cases.  
Secondly, we wish explore how truth, justice and reconciliation play out in the commissions’ choices 
of working processes. We identify two specific methods, which have been employed by both 
commissions, as our point of departure for comparing the working processes: the commissions’ 
collection and processing of qualitative statements from victims and perpetrators, and their 
conduction of public hearings as a place to share experiences of a violent past. Logically, one could 
also have chosen to compare other working areas of the commissions. However, we find these 
methods to be of specific interest to our comparison of how the three concepts played out in the work 
of the two TRCs. 
Finally, it is relevant to compare how the final reports and recommendations of the Sierra Leonean 
and Liberian TRCs were received by the political elites and the public in their countries. Based on 
our previous findings, we will discuss and compare how the concepts play out differently in relation 
to the outcome of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian TRCs. 
Altogether, these three levels of analysis will enable us to assess how the concepts of truth, justice 
and reconciliation are deployed in the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(SLTRC) and Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (LITRC), and whether one can identify 
specific patterns in the functioning of truth and reconciliation commissions. 
Consequently, we have formulated a research question and three sub-questions that will guide our 
analysis of the above-mentioned and which reads the following: 
How are the concepts of truth, justice and reconciliation deployed in the Sierra Leonean and 
Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, in terms of their formation, working 
processes and final recommendations? 
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To answer the research question satisfactory, we compare the commissions’ formation and mandates, 
the ways in which they worked and their final recommendations to the governments and responses to 
these. The three sub-questions will enable us to answer the overall question.  
- How did the political realities at the end of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian civil wars influence 
the formation of their Truth and Reconciliation Commissions? 
In order to analyse the differences and similarities in how the concepts of truth, justice and 
reconciliation have played out in relation to the two commissions, we firstly need to explore and 
compare how the Sierra Leonean and Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commissions were 
established and the mandates they were given, as these factors will highly inform the work they carry 
out subsequently. We focus on the political contexts in which they were formed, and through the two 
countries’ respective peace agreements investigate the specific set-up of the commissions. This 
question will be answered through chapter IV. 
- How did the Sierra Leonean and Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commissions seek to find truth 
by identifying conflict patterns and promote national reconciliation through public hearings? 
Secondly, we will analyse more specifically the methods of truth-finding and promoting national 
reconciliation through public hearings. The answer to this sub-question will be divided into two 
separate chapters. The first of these, chapter V, will compare the TRCs’ methods used to quantify the 
qualitative statements of human rights violations and identify certain patterns. Secondly, in chapter 
VI, we compare the ways in which the public hearings were held in each of the two cases, as well as 
the different purposes of these. These two chapters combined will enable us to answer the second 
sub-question. 
- What implications did the final reports’ recommendations have for the public response and 
processes of national reconciliation? 
The third, and last, sub-question will be answered in chapter VII. Here, we compare the TRCs’ final 
recommendations as well as the political elite and the public’s responses to these, and furthermore 
discuss the implication of the recommendations in relation to the promotion of national 
reconciliation.   
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Altogether, these three questions will enable us to answer the overall research-question. 
 
Methodology 
The following will give an account of how we approach our analysis and the strategy we will employ 
to unfold the case-comparison. Firstly, the way we concretely approach the comparative analysis will 
be clarified. Secondly, we specify our selection of cases, where after we introduce the collected 
material and the issues we encountered in this process. The last section will describe the 
delimitations we have made and through that specify what we are looking at and, equally important, 
what is not included. 
 
Comparative Case Study Design 
As we want to investigate truth and reconciliation commissions and their work in two national 
contexts in relation to specific concepts, we have chosen to do a qualitative comparative analysis of 
two commissions. Therefore, we have created a comparative case study design, which involves 
examining two contrasting cases by employing somewhat identical methods (Alan Bryman, 2008). 
This will, due to limited time and space, naturally limit the depth of our research. Nevertheless, the 
strength of a comparative case study is based on the logic of comparison, which means that it is 
argued that one can better comprehend political and social phenomena – in our case truth and 
reconciliation commissions – when they are compared in relation to other different cases (Bryman, 
2008: 58). In our study, we intend to do a cross-national comparison, which is defined as the 
investigation of particular phenomena in two or more countries, where the same research instruments 
are applied with the aim to gain a deeper understanding of a particular issue in different contexts 
(Ibid.). 
Given that we are unfolding the broader patterns of how TRCs are reshaped in national contexts, it 
makes sense to conduct a cross-national research, where we compare the differences and similarities 
of the TRCs in Sierra Leone and Liberia. This will enable us to better explain the phenomenon of 
TRCs and certain patterns by investigating the phenomenon in two national contexts, and how this is 
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affected by their social and political realities. In this sense, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean versions 
will be the basic units for analysis. Additionally, this will also enable us to assess how the three 
concepts of truth justice and reconciliation specified in the literature review will play out in our cases 
(ibid).  
We start by conducting a literature review of the existing influential literature within the academic 
field concerning truth and reconciliation commissions, which can be found in chapter II. This chapter 
will be a way for us to understand the recurrent academic views on TRCs and how these can be 
understood and analysed. From this we wish to further unfold the concepts of truth, justice and 
reconciliation, which will be clarified after the literature review and used as the theoretical lenses for 
the analysis. Additionally, we will shortly introduce the conflict histories of the Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, which enables us to understand the various actors and dynamics of the two countries. 
Thereafter, we present the Sierra Leonean and Liberian TRCs in chapter III. Thus, chapter II and 
chapter III will serve as the foundation for the comparison in the chapters IV, V, VI and VII. 
Some scholars have been critical towards the comparative case study method, claiming that that less 
attention is given to the countries’ specific contexts, and researchers become too focused on the ways 
in which the cases can be contrasted (Bryman, 2008: 61). However, as we also wish to analyse the 
broader patterns of how the Sierra Leonean and Liberian TRCs are formed in their national contexts, 
we argue that we have a somewhat more open-ended approach to our comparative design.  
 
Selection of Cases 
By exploring specific techniques for case selection, it becomes evident that there is a wide range of 
approaches through which one can choose cases; e.g. as typical case studies, where the chosen units 
are considered as representative cases; deviant cases, influential cases or most similar cases. One can 
also select case studies that are diverse so meaning that variance is great in a range of relevant 
dimensions, or case studies where cases are chosen on the basis that the they represent extreme types 
(Bryman, 2008: 60; Seawright and Gerring, 2008). 
We have chosen Sierra Leone and Liberia on the basis that the neighbouring countries have many 
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traits in common and in this sense are most similar cases. Starting with the most evident, they are 
both English-speaking countries as well as home to descendants of freed slaves (Kabba, 2006). 
Additionally, their civil wars have often been framed as interconnected in the sense that some claim 
that the civil war started in Liberia and spilled over into Sierra Leone. Both countries had one 
prominent faction leader playing a great role throughout their civil wars, namely Charles Taylor and 
Foday Sankoh, who cooperated and assisted one another several times. Evidently, these common 
conflict traits made us interested in whether the establishment of a TRC would serve identical 
purposes and if there would be a common pattern in their approaches to their past civil wars. 
Interestingly, we discovered that the two TRCs were officially set up with similar mandates of 
uncovering human rights violations during the past civil wars, which is why we chose to conduct a 
comparative case study with a selection of two similar cases. Through the comparative analysis we 
intend to uncover not only differences and similarities in the two TRCs, but also register broader 
patterns of the TRCs. 
 
Collected Material  
We apply several different types of material throughout the project. As we want to analyse how the 
truth and reconciliation commissions have been shaped in the contexts of Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
we will necessarily look at the extensive final reports derived from these two commissions. The 
reports will show us the mandates and set-up and thus the framework of their work. Furthermore, the 
reports will be used to access the methodologies utilised by each of the commissions, which will give 
us insight to how the commissions have processed their data and on which basis they have generated 
the findings of the reports. Thus, the reports will serve as a window for looking at the processes of 
the commissions, and as a means to gain some general information on how the commissions were 
created. This will help us examine how the commissions have processed the collected data and to 
compare the general set-up of the two TRCs. Furthermore, we compare the recommendations and the 
political elites’ and the public’s response to these. It is important to state that we view these reports 
as political expressions and that it cannot be rejected that the staffs of the commissions have 
carefully selected what we can read out of these, which implies that it does not reflect what happened 
in the mundane processes of making these reports. When we began to examine the reports it soon 
	   11	  
became evident that the Liberian report was less transparent and not as exhaustive as the Sierra 
Leonean report. This observation tells us something about the two TRCs in general, but it also 
creates certain limitations to how we can analyse the commissions. This is also why we have chosen 
to not solely conduct a case study based on the two reports, but the reports will be complemented by 
other official documents, such as the peace agreements and the acts that comprise the legislative 
background in which the commissions were given their mandates. 
As the reports will not be the only source of material used for analysing the commissions, the 
contextual literature on the two cases is equally important. Priscilla Hayner has produced several 
articles on both TRCs, which will complement our understanding and comparison of the structural 
setup of the commissions. Concepts from Lars Buur’s work on the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (2001) will be applied in our cases, which will enable us to analyse and 
compare the commissions’ collection and processing of statements from victims and perpetrators. 
Additionally, materials produced by scholars as Aaron Weah (2012) and Tim Kelsall (2005) will be 
used to scrutinise the public hearings in a more detailed manner. This should provide us with an 
insight to how the hearings were being held in praxis and compare that to the official purposes as 
stated in the reports. Furthermore, we will make use of other scholars who write about transitional 
justice and, more specifically, the TRCs in Liberia and Sierra Leone. At this point, it is important to 
have in mind that the Sierra Leonean commission completed their work in 2004, whereas the 
Liberian TRC ended in 2009, which could be explain why there is less scholarly research on the 
Liberian commission compare to the studies on the Sierra Leonean case. Another possible 
explanation could be that the LITRC report is less transparent relatively to the SLTRC report, which 
scholars have also commented (James-Allen, Weah and Goodfriend, 2010). In this sense, the 
academic articles available have a large influence on the manner in which we will compare the two 
TRCs, as the literature will be used to discuss and compare the relevant themes. Lastly, it is 
important to mention that we will, through a literature review, introduce TRCs as a concept in an 
international context and the role of these in transitional justice in more general terms. By looking at 
the evolvement of TRCs and the academic critique of these, we intend to clarify the three chosen 
concepts, which will be applied as our theoretical foundation in the comparison. 
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Delimitation 
As mentioned, a part of the analysis will compare the methodological approaches of the 
commissions. We could have focused solely on the methods used and how that informs the findings 
from the reports. In such an analysis it would make sense to only look at one commission’s work. 
Additionally, this would require an insight into all the comprehensive material that the commission 
have collected and processed. Instead, we are interested in comparing the methods employed to 
classify violations, victims and perpetrators as part of the broader comparison of the two TRCs. 
We have chosen not to explain the two countries’ conflict histories or causes for the outbreak of civil 
wars. It could have been relevant to analyse the countries’ patterns of conflict or violence1, however 
we will not enter such a discussion as we are interested in the work of TRCs.  However, we will deal 
with common traits of the two civil wars as the end of the conflicts influence the work of TRCs. 
Moreover, we have chosen not to enter the subject of the two TRCs’ interpretations of international 
law, i.e. international human rights law or international humanitarian law.  
Additionally, we have chosen to engage in a comparative analysis of truth and reconciliation 
commissions, and not other transitional justice mechanisms present in the two countries, such as the 
Special Court, security sector reforms, memorials etc. However, we do still include these 
mechanisms in the analysis when relevant to the work of the TRCs, as we recognise that TRCs 
should be understood in the more general context of other transitional justice mechanisms that are 
present. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 There is an immense body of literature on this theme: for an institutional view on war see i.e. Kalevi J. Holsti (2004a) 
who claims that there are three contradictory tendencies of war in the world: both institutionalisation and de-
institutionalisation of war and obsolescence of war. See also i.e. Christopher Cramer (2002) for a critique of economic 
theorist’s way of explaining war. 
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Chapter II: The Rise of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
To concretise the three concepts, we will in the following chapter outline the multiplicity of TRCs 
truth by exploring the historical evolvement of these. Through such an examination, we intend to 
review the dominant literature on transitional justice in general and on Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in specific.  
Firstly, we will present the development of general tendencies within the processes of transitional 
justice in order to understand the role of TRCs as one specific mechanism in the transitional justice 
paradigm. Secondly, we will provide a review of the most dominant conceptions concerning TRCs 
within academic literature. This review will commence with the first internationally acknowledged 
commission in Argentina, while drawing links to other truth commissions, and finally present the 
success-story from South Africa. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be 
given particular attention, as it has been regarded as the most influential in producing a template of a 
TRC. We will also present some of the critique directed towards these TRCs, which enables us to 
identify some recurring arguments. Lastly, the various themes in the academic literature review will 
be distilled, allowing us to concretise our three concepts of truth, justice and reconciliation that will 
guide our comparison and the way we will unfold the contexts of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
commissions. 
 
Introduction to Transitional Justice 
The origin of Transitional Justice (TJ) cannot be given a specific date; however, after World War I, 
an earlier version of TJ has been identified. Nevertheless, it was not before after World War II 
(WWII), with the practice of international law, that the form of TJ known today emerged (Teitel, 
2003). This type encompasses multiple practices seeking to deal with the past in post conflict 
countries that are in transition from one rule to another (Rosalind Shaw & Lars Waldorf, 2010). 
These practices include e.g. war prosecutions, truth and reconciliation commissions, memorials, 
special courts, mass grave mappings and reparations. Consequently, transitional justice can be 
defined as “(…) the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterised 
by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes” (Teitel, 2003: 
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69). In a similar manner, Joanna R. Quinn defines transitional justice as “(…) the process by which 
societies move from either war to peace or from repressive/authoritarian regime to democracy while 
dealing with resulting questions of justice and what to do with social, political, and economic 
institutions” (Quinn, 2009: 3).  The specific setup differs from context to context, as the types of 
conflicts influence the ways in which TJ practices are conducted. As we wish to explore specific 
working processes of TRCs, it is important to be aware of the larger TJ setup, which can consist of 
various institutions, such as war tribunals or special courts.  
TJ has become a more common process, which Teitel coins as a paradigm of rule of law in 
international humanitarian justice discourses (Teitel, 2003). Teitel has identified three phases, which 
shows that TJ is not a constant, stable construct. The first phase of TJ as emerged shortly after 
WWII, where the winners sought to hold the leaders of the third Reich accountable for occurrences 
during WWII under international justice in the Nuremberg Trials, which could be called retributive 
justice. Thus, this period turned TJ towards international rule of law (Ibid). This has to be understood 
in the context of the political setting and the predominant rationalities at the time. There was a strong 
and positive belief in universal international law and, consequently, there was a shift in international 
justice from focusing on states to a focus on individual criminal prosecution under the rule of 
universal law2. The second phase, she argues, played out in the 1980s and 1990s, which saw a shift 
in the focus of TJ. The international environment was then marked by the collapse of the Soviet 
Empire, which initiated liberalisation processes, starting in South America and later in other parts of 
the globe. In the second phase, universal international law was to be regarded as an ideal and TJ was 
understood as a process of making compromises and fostering democratic institutions, rather than 
merely accountability through retributive justice. As Teitel argues, TJ became a dialogue between 
victims and perpetrators, rather than an instrument to obtain universal justice. The third and current 
phase, at the time of Teitel’s publication in 2003, can be viewed as the result of a normalisation 
process of TJ. The use of TJ is not limited to extraordinary cases, but is applied more widespread in 
transition processes. A symbol of this is the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
which demonstrates a “move back” to international law and universal human rights 3. However, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For a discussion on the universalism of international law see i.e.: David Armstrong (1999) who argues that international 
law is still a relation among states not among individuals. See also Holsti, Kalevi J. (2004b). 
3 For a discussion on the gradual historical evolvement of the human rights paradigm see i.e.:  Kenneth Cmiel (2004), 
Mark Mazower (2004) or Roger Normand & Sarah Zaidi (2008). See also Jack Donnelly (2007) for a critique of 
universalism in human rights. 
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current phase is different from the first one, as there is a significant rising focus on the localisation of 
TJ. NGOs and other organisations alike are thought to represent the local voice and will through this 
create more successful contextual TJ processes (Shaw & Waldorf, 2010).  
From this introduction one can conclude that TJ is not a stable and uniform concept. Rather, the 
specific transitional justice landscape varies across contexts in which it has been applied. Associated 
meanings and practices have changed along different trajectories, depending on political rationalities 
at the international level, as Teitel demonstrates, but also depending on the ways in which it has been 
‘localised’ at national levels, as argued by i.e. Shaw and Waldorf. The manner in which TJ is 
‘localised’ depends on various factors, such as a country’s political and institutional set-up. These are 
some important points to keep in mind when progressing to a literature review of truth and 
reconciliation commissions. 
 
A Review of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions  
Since the beginning of the 1980s, and to a greater extent in the 1990s, there has been a significant 
increase in the use of TRCs in post-conflict societies as an approach of processing a violent past. 
Hayner acknowledges that it is: “(...) fast becoming a staple in the transitional justice menu of 
options” (Hayner in Christian M. De Vos, 2010: 210). This has to be regarded in the context of the 
emerging global discourses on human rights throughout this period of time. Most TRCs are argued to 
“(...) institute democratic forms of governance and encourage democracy cultures” (Goodman, 2009: 
9). The evolvement of human rights have had a great influence on shaping transitional justice and 
thus also on the growing appreciation of TRCs in cases of democratic transition. Therefore, the 
development of TRCs has to be understood in an international context and by the evolvement of 
human rights. 
Multiple Truth Commissions have been set up with a range of objectives. The list of TRCs 1983 – 
1995 include: Uruguay (1985), Zimbabwe (1985), Uganda (1986), The Philippines (1986), Chile 
(1990), Chad (1990), Southern Africa (ANC I) 1992, El Salvador (1991), Germany (1992), Rwanda 
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(1992), Southern Africa (ANC II) (1993), Ethiopia (1993), Haiti 19954. These commissions were set 
up with different goals, such as investigating human rights violations, ensuring accountability, 
recovery and peace. The motives overlap and work at different levels, and TRCs are often set up 
with a mixture of various objects. However, TRCs can generally be framed as: “(...) bodies set up to 
investigate a past history of violations of human rights in a particular country – which can include 
violations by the military or other government forces or by armed opposition forces” (Hayner, 1994: 
600). Despite the multiplicity of TRCs, sociologist Deborah Posel argues that there are some 
common defining features, as they often are focused on uncovering truths about human rights 
violations during a specific period of time (Posel, 2008: 121). The selected commissioners for the 
TRC usually comprise a ‘representative moral elite’, who identifies types of violence to assess 
crimes (ibid). Normally, TRCs will seek to gather testimonies from victims and use the statement to 
knit together a narrative of the past conflict. 
Many scholars agree that one common feature of TRCs is that they are typically established as in a 
time of transition from one type of regime to a democracy. As Posel puts it, the transition is often: “ 
(…) represented and constituted in the name of a newfound embrace of human rights” (Posel, 2008: 
120). Additionally, a typical outcome of TRCs is recommendations for the national and international 
level (ibid). Thus, as demonstrated, TRCs do not represent a uniform stable entity. However, some 
broad common characteristics are still evident. Priscilla Hayner defines TRCs as consisting of four 
elements: 
“First, a truth commission focuses on the past. Second, a truth commission is not focused on a 
specific event, but attempts to paint the overall picture of certain human rights abuses, or violations 
of international humanitarian law, over a period of time. Third, a truth commission usually exists 
temporarily and for a pre-defined period of time, ceasing to exist with the submission of a report of 
its findings. Finally, a truth commission is always vested with some sort of authority, by way of its 
sponsor, that allows it greater access to information, greater security or protection to dig into 
sensitive issues, and a greater impact with its report” (Hayner, 1994: 600). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Priscilla Hayner (1994) has identified fifteen commissions from 1974 to 1993 – we have included Haiti’s TRC from 
1995 as it is on Amnesty International’s list of TRC. We have not included the Sri Lankan TRC as it did not publish its 
report before the South African TRC started its work. This is not a perfect list of commissions that was dealing with the 
past in this period, in other countries such as Greece and Israel has also had process although it is not completely clear-
cut if these can be termed truth commissions some argue that they cannot be called truth commissions. This underlines 
the point that truth commission are not uniform clear-cut remembrance-bodies. 
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Although this is a rather broad definition, it encapsulates the basic traits of TRCs and serves as a 
foundation for investigating their evolvement.  
The first internationally recognised truth commission was established in Argentina in 1983, where 
after other countries followed suit by creating similar commissions (Hayner, 1994). These varied on 
many parameters, which can explained by the fact that TRCs are not definite institutional 
machineries, but complex entities that vary depending on multiple inter-related factors in the 
contextual setting that they have been established. It is not the purpose of this review to explore the 
various commissions. Instead, the aim is to demonstrate that there is not one TRC model, as they can 
be comprehended as a constructed phenomenon concerned with processing a violent past and 
creating a vision for the future of a given nation.  
 
The First Internationally Recognised Truth Commission  
Before the truth commission in Argentina, two less known commissions were established; the first 
one being located in Uganda in 1974, which was set out to investigate the crimes of Idi Amin in the 
first years of his regime. However, the process never resulted in a report (Hayner, 1994). 
Additionally, in 1982, the newly elected Bolivian government, which marked the return to 
democratic rule, created a truth commission to collect testimonies that should uncover 155 
disappearances. Yet, no cases were conclusively investigated (Ibid).  
As mentioned, the first internationally recognised truth commission was that of Argentina, which 
was established in 1983 and published a report in 1984. Initially, the commission was to examine 
the: “fates of the thousands who disappeared during the junta rule” (CONADEP, 1984: prologue), 
and was different from earlier commissions, as it was established in the transition from dictatorship 
to civilian rule. This was the beginning of what Teitel frames as the second phase of TJ. The 
commission was to find the truth about “the dirty war” in the 1970s, where thousands of people 
disappeared. Mario Di Paolantino (1997) argues that it was an attempt to integrate the “dirty war” 
into Argentinean national memory in order to create an “imagined community”5. The commission 
functioned to seek truth and justice, but also as a technique of creating collective memories. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  See Benedict Anderson (1993) for a clarification of the notion ”imagined community”. 
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However, the process of creating a national narrative resulted in an exercise of inclusion and 
exclusion. As Paolantonio states, the narrative of the nation could never become uniform in the 
commission’s report. In the Argentinean case, the creation a common national narrative also created 
room for reading narratives differently (Paolantonio, 1997: 452). Those excluded from the common 
narrative might read it differently and claim that it was wrong or misleading (Paolantonio, 1997). 
The Argentinean case illustrates one of TRCs’ problematic issues regarding justice, and commissions 
have approached the issue differently. The Chilean Truth Commission of 1990 did not include cases 
of torture that did not result in death, resulting in a list of victims that did not include survivors of 
torture (Hayner, 2002). During the same period, the Chadian TRC was the first commission to name 
perpetrators for human rights violations (IRIN News, 2013a). These two cases demonstrate how 
processes of truth-telling also functioned as categorisations victims and perpetrators, balancing 
between justices and assessing the past. Not only did the commission not include certain types of 
violence, but it also categorised victims and arguably excluded certain individuals’ stories. Thus, the 
interconnection between truth and justice is more complicated than as such. The commissions before 
the South African TRC have been criticised for either practicing a rigid type of retributive justice or 
providing full amnesty and failing to address impunity. 
 
The Success Story and the Critics of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
In the following, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) will be 
introduced along with different critiques of this commission and general literature on TRCs when 
relevant. This is done to locate key concepts in the immense body of literature on the subject and 
further concretise an approach to similar subjects in the context of Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
The SATRC was established in 1995 at the end of apartheid and has been regarded as an exemplary 
template for building a viable truth and reconciliation commission (Goodman, 2009: 23). The 
SATRC has been framed by Robert Rotberg as a “(...) a model for all future commissions” (Rotberg 
in Rotberg & Thompson, 2000: 4-6). Additionally, it has been claimed that “(…) one can divide the 
history of truth commissions into two periods: before South Africa, and after” (Freeman in Millar, 
2011: 521). There was a clear break in the set-up of TRCs before and after the SATRC. Rotberg 
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explains that the first commissions did not dare to carry out public hearings, as they were afraid that 
it might be transgressive. Contrastingly, the SATRC insisted on public and private testimonies, along 
with a public interrogation of perpetrators and television reports (Rotberg in Rotberg & Thompson, 
2000: 5-6). Chairman of the commission, Archbishop Demond Tutu, eagerly claimed that as a result 
of the work of the TRC, “No one in South Africa (will) ever again be able to say ‘I did not know’” 
(Tutu, 1999: 91). 
The SATRC began its proceedings in 1996 and a final report was released in 2003. That the 
commission was established after the apartheid is no coincidence, as Tina Rosenberg (1995) argues: 
TRCs confrontations of the past serve as a way to heal the victims and alter the circumstances that 
nurtured dictatorship to consolidate the new type of rule. It is also important to note that South Africa 
had various choices for approaching its violent past; the selection of establishing a TRC was not 
given beforehand. As Goodman argues, “(...) the sheer fact that modern nations believe they are 
compelled to reckon with their past, especially if they have histories of collective violence, and (...) 
is representative of an emerging global master narrative premised on notions of individual human 
rights and talk therapy” (Goodman, 2009: 9). Yet, given that all political parties negotiated peace in 
South Africa, many of the former apartheid officials stayed in powerful positions, and the SATRC 
could not explicitly declare any parties as being ultimate winners and losers at the risk of alienating 
supporters of the former regime. We will from this point introduce some of the critiques of the 
SATRC from which we will clarify our main concepts that we will apply in our comparative 
analysis. 
 
Truth & Reconciliation Commissions as Social Healing 
The new focus on reconciliation was a break with the earlier truth commissions, and the SATRC was 
the first to introduce the word “reconciliation” in the institutional concept of TRCs. Stephen 
Landsman (1996) has, along these lines, argued that the work of the truth commissions can serve as a 
catalyst in creating social healing and as a way to prevent future misconduct. He further proposed, in 
his normative article, several alternative responses to human right abuses. His article shows the 
emerging focus on reconciliation in TRCs in the years after the South African commission. Another 
scholar who has discussed the possibilities of reconciliation in positive terms is Martha Minow 
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(1998). She argues that the work of the commissions is better suited as a mean for social healing for 
the population than prosecutions are. 
Minow (1998) argues that one of the ways in which processes of social healing is approached is by 
gathering personal statements, which can assist individuals in post-conflict societies in recalling and 
remembering the past in order to fully recover and move on. Thus, TRCs can function as a type of 
therapy. Wars are said to not only undermine humanity through its atrocities, but also to dehumanise 
those who survive (Minow, 1999: 435). Consequently, survivors tend to repress memories of a 
violent past. Individuals need to remember atrocities in order to resolve how to prevent them in the 
future. With the aid of TRCs, a collective memory can be produced, which can “(...) reconstitute a 
community of humanity against which there can be crimes (hence, “crimes against humanity”), and 
within which victims and survivors can be claimed as worthy members” (Minow, 1999: 430). 
 
Balancing Between “Vengeance and Forgiveness” 
The introduction of reconciliation in truth commissions opened up for a more general academic 
debate on the relation between giving amnesty and still ensuring accountability. The SATRC stated 
that it would neither practice impunity nor vengeance, as previous commissions had done (Mamdani, 
2002: 33; SATRC, 2003). Yet, the SATRC faced the issue of perpetrators being not only individuals 
from state institutions but also from liberation movements. This made classifications of victims and 
perpetrators unclear, and as Lars Buur (2001) asked, how then to achieve a sense of justice without 
granting total amnesty or prosecuting every individual involved in the atrocities? (Buur, 2001: 150). 
Political scientist Kimberley Lanegran is critical towards the use of amnesty in general and calls it 
“(...) official forgetting” (Lanegran, 2005: 113). Lanegran further argues that domestic as well as 
international actors compete to control institutions, where TRCs are no exception as they have the: 
“(...) mandate to investigate and interpret the past (Lanegran, 2005: 113). She demonstrates, through 
a comparison of five countries' truth-finding efforts, that the outcome of these TRCs was products of 
political negotiations. The fact that certain things are included while others are excluded, suggests a 
process of selective forgetting, which shapes the collective memory of the past. Additionally, 
Lanegran acknowledges that in cases where amnesty is not mandated, it is likely that people will be 
afraid to give testimonies in fear of being prosecuted (Lanegran, 2005). 
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Legal scholars, such as Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roth-Arriaza (1995) are also critical towards 
impunity and argue that this is one of the biggest issues of TRCs, as the commissions might actually 
impede accountability by not bringing about judicial action. Popkin and Roth-Arriaza (1995) further 
state that some commissions are not successful in making actual structural changes to prevent future 
wrongdoings. The granting of amnesty and freedom to perpetrators in return of total confession 
turned out to become one of the more controversial issues in the SATRC's approach, i.e. it has been 
viewed by some scholars as being “trading justice for truth”, in the sense that truth made public is 
itself a form of justice (see i.e. Heribert Adam, 1998). Several legal scholars have also claimed that 
impunity is an issue in the work of TRCs. Yet, as argued by Elizabeth Kiss (2000) one can also 
distinguish between the contrasting outcomes of retributive- and restorative justice processes. Kiss 
claims that TRCs’ type of restorative justice can promote a construction of a more just society in 
general. She further states that due to its investigative, judicial, political and therapeutic features, a 
TRC can create morally ambitious ends to societies in transition. According to Kiss, instrumental 
punishment as the only transitional justice mechanism for processing of past event hinders an 
achievement of full societal reconciliation. The individual-centred approach of truth-telling, on the 
other hand, based on reconciliation by confronting perpetrators and victims contribute meaningfully 
to restorative justice. Kiss continues by claiming that TRCs provide a mechanism to process justice 
in a manner that acknowledges that victims and perpetrators were on more than one side, and where 
a just society therefore needs to be fully restored (Kiss, 2000).  
A significant part of TRC literature do explore various notions of how justice should be approached, 
given that many TRCs take a quasi-justice form, as argued by Buur (2001). In the SATRC, there has 
been a tendency of moving from retributive justice towards uncovering truths and searching 
reconciliation and recommending amnesty (Rotberg, 2000). Martha Minow coins the restorative 
power of truth-telling as a type of justice moving in “between vengeance and forgiveness” (Minow, 
1998), implying that neither vengeance through total prosecution nor full forgiveness will enable a 
post-conflict society to found sustainable peace. The most distinctive element of this justice, in 
comparison with judicial prosecution, is the shift in focus from perpetrators to victims (Minow, 
1998: 325). 
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Truth versus Justice 
The SATRC's mandate was framed as to enable processes of individual and national reconciliation 
by exploring the truth about Gross Human Rights Violations (GHRV) (Buur, 2001: 149). By the time 
of the establishment of the SATRC, the commission was unique in its structure, as it on one hand 
provided a space for victims having experienced GHRV to share their stories, while on the other 
hand put in place a process for awarding limited amnesty for perpetrators disclosing the “whole 
truth”. Despite extreme diversity in personal experiences and various perspectives on divided and 
contested pasts, the SATRC sought to write public history based on the objective “truth” collected 
through statements from more than 20,000 survivors, which would ideally lead to a shared 
understanding of past experiences (Posel, 2008: 120). However, Jeffrey Anthea (2000) questions the 
confidence of the SATRC in its success of excluding lies and denials and uncovering a strong truth 
of the past. He states that the commission has only focused on half of the truth in history and been 
selective in its narrative of that story. This issue of selective truth invokes a concern for justice, as 
the TRCs do not have the mandate to prosecute perpetrators.  
The relationship between justice and truth is at the heart of much literature on TRCs. Posel (2008) 
frames the relationship between justice and truth as the conundrum of TRCs, and explains how this 
conundrum is a shared epistemological and ethical challenge of the TRCs. Although TRCs seek to 
unfold the truth of past events, testimonies can be said to be versions of the past and not necessarily 
equate the truth from all perspectives of the involved. Thus, one could argued that TRCs are:  
“charged with having to redeem the modern confidence in the idea of truth as the basis of a morally 
robust life” and further asks “... how then to reconcile the claim to authoritative, objective truth 
along with the recognition of both the epistemological limits and ethical risks of such a claim?” 
(Posel, 2008: 127). 
Buur advances the critique of the SATRC by describing the process through which the commission 
produced certain material cleaned of ambiguities for the script of new national history. In the 
exercise of selecting victims for truth-telling, relevant and irrelevant truths were processed and cases 
not proper for the SATRC's human rights schema were rejected (Buur, 2001:162). Therefore, the 
production of specific truth claims had implications for the outcome of the report, as some events 
were classified as GHRV in the reconstruction of historical events and included, while others were 
not and excluded. The methodology used by the SATRC employees to collect testimonies was based 
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on processing information in a database, which classified victims, perpetrators and witnesses 
according to distinct categories (Buur, 2001: 163-164). For every victim identified there had to be a 
perpetrator and the classification of such depended on the manner in which GHRV were identified 
and counted (Buur, 2001: 168). Given that information had to “fit in” to the classification schema, 
the processing consequently reshaped the past in particular directions.  
Buur questions what really characterises the truth produced by the SATRC, and how this is to be 
seen as legitimate and authoritative truth in national and international contexts. He argues that one 
cannot classify individual stories as GHRV with a positivistic methodology. Nevertheless, the work 
of the SATRC is still informing actions and prominent decisions (Buur, 2001: 163-167). Buur further 
claims that facts produced by the SATRC are essentially artefacts, as individual identities and 
memories were formed through interaction and negotiation. Consequently, by categorising data 
collection, testimonies have been transformed into unambiguous identities of victims, perpetrators 
and witnesses (Buur, 2001: 171-172). The outcome is the social categories of victims, perpetrators 
and witnesses, and negotiations have disappeared from the processed material, which in the future 
will be applied in other contexts of statistics (see also Wilson, 2001: 33–61). As mentioned above, 
the SATRC is constructing a clear transformation from the old to the new nation-state. However, 
Buur argues that much of the construction is produced inside the “bureaucratic machinery of truth 
production” that processes and classifies all testimonies according to a rigid GHRV schema with the 
intention of producing an absolute truth of the past. In this sense, the SATRC are in a double 
manoeuvre of both displaying and removing – The TRC is simultaneously about remembering and 
forgetting (Burr, 2001: 176). 
 
Disconnecting the Commission from State Bureaucracy 
Buur demonstrates how the SATRC was disconnected from the state and society in technical terms 
to create an impartial unity for processing the conflicts. He further states that the SATRC's quasi-
legal status also prevented court proceedings and tribunals in disturbing the storytelling carried out 
by the SATRC. Yet, the commission's work was framed within international law and the Geneva 
Convention of Human Rights, which permeated the public hearings and made it complex to separate 
the hearings from a court process (Buur, 2001: 160-161). The SATRC's technical separation from the 
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court and its legal discourse could arguably enable the commission to neutralise the work with past 
conflicts and organise them in a manner so that individual experiences could be encapsulated in a 
legal framework. However, as a consequence, the “(...) past is determined by legislative provision 
and by the particular manner in which legislation is interpreted” (Buur, 2001: 161). This means that 
the norms, action, and interpretations of international law for various truth commissions are not 
necessarily identical.  
 
A Technique of Nation-State Formation 
Lars Buur (2001) and Richard A. Wilson (2001) have both described how the SATRC's work can be 
comprehended as a technique of nation-state formation. Buur analyses the relation between visible 
representations of the SATRC process and the invisible bureaucratic routines – the front stage and 
the backstage (Buur, 2001: 172). Buur claims that ”(...) the information made public in the hearing 
process, the media, and the final report is important because it is here that the representation of the 
new nation-state is displayed, both the “heroic” inclusions and the excluded “other” of the nation-
state” (Buur, 2001: 175). Wilson states, in line with Buur’s studies, that after the instalment of the 
SATRC the government of ANC sought to represent itself as seeking the truth of the past, as well as 
being impartial in stark contrast to the old apartheid regime (Wilson, 2001: 13-17). Furthermore, 
Wilson claims that promoting human rights were part of the political elite’s project to build a new 
nation. His arguments follows that the project of building a new state in South Africa was, from the 
elite, based on western ideas of rule of law through human rights (Wilson, 2001). 
In the case of South Africa, victims of GRHV were invited to come forward in hearings to publicly 
share their stories, while perpetrators were granted amnesty if telling the “whole” truth, as this was 
viewed as an accommodating gesture towards victims. Yet, some perpetrators were sentenced for life 
for not disclosing the truth. Buur therefore argues that the contrasting display clearly served to 
cement a shift in power from perpetrators to victims; from one class and social group to another and 
represented an essential part in the construction of a new South African nation-state (Buur, 2001: 
152-153). 
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Sub-conclusion and Clarification of Concepts 
This chapter began with a short introduction to the concept of transitional justice in order to 
comprehend how TRCs have emerged as an instrument for post-conflict societies to approach a 
violent past. The development of transitional justice has to be seen in relation to the evolving 
international human rights discourse. Thereafter, the origin of the first TRCs was presented along 
with a brief description of the first internationally recognised TRC in Argentina. The successful 
SATRC became an international template for establishing a TRC, which might also be the reason for 
why many scholars' profound interest in carrying out research on this specific constellation. The 
SATRC was the first TRC to introduce the notion of reconciliation as well as public hearings by 
victims and perpetrators, as it attempted to balance between vengeance and forgiveness in its 
processing of the past, which several previous TRCs had failed to manage. Although the SATRC has 
been criticised by many scholars, some have also recognised its potential to promote a sense of social 
healing. Other, more critical, scholars have argued that the premise of the SATRC's work is 
misleading in the sense that the commission produces its own version of the truth of the past with the 
intent of promoting an image of the new nation-state. That specific testimonies were included and 
remembered, while others were excluded and forgotten gives evidence to the argument that the 
SATRC was a highly political project, not necessarily consistent with different perceptions of 
realities. In the following, we will identify some concepts, which will guide our analysis of Liberia 
and Sierra Leone's TRCs. In the following, we will elaborate on the three concepts at hand, which 
will be applied as cross-cutting concepts in the comparative analysis. 
 
Truth 
Through the literature review, we have experienced how the concept of ‘truth’ is widely explored by 
scholars concerned with TRCs. As the claimed purpose of TRCs is to establish a common history of 
past tragedies in one form or another, scholars question to what extent this history covers the whole 
truth and how this truth is sought to be captured and represented. Along these lines, we will view 
truth, produced from theses commissions, as constructed. More specifically, we view these 
constructed truths as manufactured through negotiations by various actors, who are involved in the 
process of creating a specific TRC and its framework for investigating the past. What this means for 
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our analysis is that we need to investigate how the TRCs of Liberia and Sierra Leone has been 
established and who participated in these processes. We will also examine how the two 
commissions’ classification of victims, perpetrators and witnesses, and, moreover, what types of 
violence were included in the commissions’ work of collecting and interpreting statements that could 
be used to generate an analysis of the conflict histories and thus in the end a certain type of truth. 
Building on the ideas of Buur (2001) and Wilson (2001), we will investigate what elements have 
been included and which have been excluded in the commissions’ work. Therefore, this project 
focuses on the social production of ‘truth’ as part of TJ/TRC processes, as this is thought to 
contribute to reconciliation and must be comprehended as an instrument of nation-state formation. 
We are aware of the fact that there are various theories and views on truth, as it is also a theoretical 
concept, which has been discussed by a wide range of scholars. However, we will not engage in such 
a discussion, but rather delimit truth to be applied in a more narrow, contextual sense in our 
comparison, where we will compare how truth is sought to be found through the work of the TRCs 
as a way for the Liberian and Sierra Leonean populations to confront the past and as a mean to 
promote national reconciliation. 
 
Justice 
Another predominant concept discussed in the literature is that of justice. As we have observed from 
the above review, it is important to distinguish between retributive and restorative justice. Different 
interpretations have been introduced in relation to the role of amnesty and the issue of justice and 
accountability. Some argue that the act of providing amnesty can endanger feelings of justice. This is 
due to the fact that in some cases amnesty has been given as “compensation” for collaboration and, 
in relation that, justice to some extent remains unaddressed. Various scholars have been critical to 
this idea and frame it as “trading justice for truth”. In the later comparison, we will in this light 
examine whether or not amnesty was given and discuss how each of the TRCs addressed 
respectively restorative and retributive justice. In more concrete terms, we will examine the mandate 
given and the ways in which alleged perpetrators can be granted amnesty for collaborating with the 
TRCs, and possibly give examples of such instances. Moreover we will, by investigating the 
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responses of the recommendations and how these have been implemented, discuss how the issue of 
justice has been addressed in both of the cases.  
 
Reconciliation 
As the one of the overall purposes of TRCs in general is to promote reconciliation, this concept will 
be the third cross-cutting concept. Legal scholars in particular have been positive towards the 
possibilities for TRCs to facilitate reconciliation. Some argue that these types of commissions are 
better suited for creating “social healing” than retributive justice. In connection hereof, we will 
assess how social healing was practiced though public hearings in both of the cases and how these 
had similar or different features. The purpose of doing so is also to analyse to what extent the 
processes of social healing reveal patterns in the two cases. Furthermore, we will also make use of 
the concept reconciliation in broader terms, when we discuss whether reconciliation is actually 
obtainable in Sierra Leone and Liberia, on the backdrop of the report’s final recommendations. 
Additionally, we view reconciliation as a more overall concept, given that reconciliation comprises 
the two previous concepts in the sense that justice and truth will arguably influence the processes of 
reconciliation.  
These three concepts will not be restricted to specific analytical chapters. Instead, they will be 
touched upon in various degrees in each of the chapters. In some chapters they will be more 
predominant than in others. However, it is important that we pay equal attention to both of the cases 
each time we make use of the concepts, as it will enable us to forge a stronger comparison of the 
Sierra Leonean and Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. 
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Chapter III: Sierra Leone & Liberia’s Civil Wars & the Rise of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
The following chapter will be separated into two main sections, where the first part will summarise 
the most important historical events and dynamics of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra. This will 
serve as a general foundation for our comprehension of the conflicts and, most importantly, explain 
the different the political contexts at the end of the civil wars. This is important for understanding the 
nature of the various actors who were involved in the signing of the peace agreements, and thus also 
for the formation of the two countries’ respective truth and reconciliation commissions. The second 
part should be seen in continuation of the account for the two civil wars, as we will present Sierra 
Leone’s and Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. We will focus on their mandate, 
working processes and recommendations. Thus, the chapter will serve as background information 
and will point to certain features of the conflicts and the set-up of the commissions, which are 
relevant for our comparative analysis in the following chapters. 
 
The History of Sierra Leone & Liberia’s Civil Wars  
The First Liberian Civil War began in 24 December 1989, when Charles Taylor and 168 men 
invaded Liberia from their base in Côte d’Ivoire under the name National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL). Taylor claimed that he wanted to overthrow President Samuel Doe given his brutal regime, 
which led to great aggressiveness towards potential opponents and ethnic rivals. By May 1990, 
Taylor and the NPFL had gained control over large areas of the country and arrived in the capital of 
Monrovia six months after their invasion (Pham, 2004: 97-101).  
The conflict in Sierra Leone officially began 23 March 1991 at the eastern borders with Liberia by 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Abdullah, 2004). Foday Saybanah Sankoh, the leader of the 
RUF, joined the army in the 1970, but soon left and was convicted and imprisoned for his 
involvement in a coup attempt in 1971. After his release, he organised the RUF with student groups 
(Lasana Gberie, 2005). There is still disagreement of to what extent the NPFL played a role in the 
attack on March 23 1991 (Wai, 2012).  
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Dynamics of the Civil Wars 
As will be seen in the following, the collusion of various factions made the conflicts complex and the 
dynamics of the civil wars difficult to comprehend both in Liberia and Sierra Leone.    
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) entered the conflict in Liberia to 
enforce a cease-fire, and President Doe was to resign and an interim government to be installed 
(Pham, 2004: 103-108; Cleaver & Massey, 2006: 180-181). However, President Doe was kidnapped 
and murdered by a splinter faction from NPFL (Ibid.). Still, Amos Saywer became President of the 
Interim Government of National Unity 1990-1994, despite Taylor refusing to cooperate with the 
transitional government (Pham, 2004: 109-100). Taylor eventually became strongly pressured by an 
anti-NPFL group, ULIMO, consisting of former President Doe's previous officers, who had taken 
refugee in neighbouring countries, mainly Sierra Leone 6.  
In 1992 in Sierra Leone, a group of ex-soldiers of the national army and other independent officers 
joined forces with the RUF, who carried out a coup and took control over Freetown. After 
negotiations between the faction leaders, a military government named National Provisional Ruling 
Council (NPRC) under Captain Valentine Strasser was formed (Abraham, 2004a). Sankoh wanted a 
broader inclusive government, which led to violent conflicts after the 1992-coup. The changing 
dynamics of the collaborations and conflicts between the RUF and the NPRC perpetuated the civil 
war (Abraham, 2004a). The NPRC-rule was welcomed at first, but soon hereafter; primarily due to 
low or no wages, parts of the NPRC rule and the RUF was once again raiding and looting (Fyle, 
2006). The constantly changing characters and unpredictable nature of collusions, gave the soldiers 
the name: ‘sobels’, which, by the words of Gberie, refers to: “soldiers by day and rebels by night” 
(Gberie, 2005). Later in 1996, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected president, and he signed a peace 
accord with the RUF’s leader, Sankoh. However, in 1997, John Paul Koroma, the leader of the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) joined forces with the RUF, with whom the AFRC 
had previously been fighting (Fyle, 2006). They overthrew President Kabbah in a state coup and his 
government fled to Guinea. The period after the May 1997 Coup d’état was the most violent period 
in the Sierra Leonean civil war. The AFRC/RUF-rule did not last long. The military force of 
ECOWAS, Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), stormed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In 1991, ULIMO lead three thousand fighters into Liberia, who were recruited among Krahn and Mandingo refugees in 
Sierra Leone. (Pham, 2004: 110, Waugh, 2011:158-159). 
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Freetown in 1998 and Kabbah was reinstalled as president. The RUF and a mix of ‘sobels’ under the 
lead of Koroma made a last attempt to take over Freetown and invaded it in January 6 1999 (Ibid). 
Eventually, ECOMOG pushed the RUF/’sobels’ out of Freetown. Shortly after, peace negotiations 
between Foday Sankoh, John Paul Koroma and the Kabbah-government were instigated, and the 
Lomé peace-agreement took shape (Abraham, 2004b). 
In Liberia, Taylor changed tactics as he was losing territory to other factions, and signed a peace 
agreement with all Liberian factions in Cotonou, Benin in July 25, 1993. Many new factions 
emerged in this period along with even further violence despite the peace agreement (Waugh, 2011: 
164-66; 172). While violent conflicts played out, the situation gave NPFL a chance to promote itself 
as the true government. Together with other factions, Taylor launched a series of manipulative 
conspiracies against other factions (Waugh, 2011: 173-178). In 1996, ECOWAS managed to make 
all faction leaders accept a new cease-fire agreement, and elections were scheduled for July 1997, 
resulting in a surprising landslide victory for Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Party with more 
than 70 % of the votes (Levitt, 2005: 210). Yet, Taylor was facing pressures to his regime's authority 
from international, regional and domestic sides (Levitt, 2005: 211). By April 1998, the political 
climate in Liberia became tense, as Taylor did not fully cooperate with ECOMOG in the 
disarmament of 35,000 former combatants, but reintegrated many of the 21,000 fighters (4,000 of 
whom were children) into the national army, Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), leading to an increase 
in violence (Levitt, 2005: 212-215). In 1999, the United States, Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone 
accused Taylor's government of supporting the RUF in Sierra Leone by pointing to the relation 
between Taylor and RUF commander Sam “Mosquito” Bockarie (Levitt, 2005: 215-216) 7. At the 
same time, opposition to Taylor rapidly advanced in Liberia.  
In 1999, the RUF from Sierra Leone, with Liberian support, crossed over the Guinean border and 
attacked with large numbers of casualties to follow. Guinean president Lansana Conté prepared a 
backlash against RUF by supporting the faction Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD), founded by Liberians with Mandingo and Krahn ethnicity (Levitt, 2005: 216-220). In 1999, 
the second Liberian Civil War began, when LURD emerged. Over the following three years, LURD 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 A UN report confirmed that Liberian arms were shipped to RUF in exchange for diamonds, and the UN imposed 
sanctions on the Liberian government by banning arms importation and exports of diamonds from Liberia (Waugh, 2011: 
263-264). 
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led a strong campaign against Taylor. By 2001, the LURD had gained control over the north, and 
was heading towards Monrovia, where they encountered the Taylor's forces. Battles continued in 
2001-2002, and both Taylor's forces and LURD were accused of extreme human rights abuses and 
child soldier recruitment (Cleaver & Massey, 2006: 182-183). In 2003, the Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) formed in and supported by Côte d’Ivoire also launched offensives 
against Taylor from the East (ibid.). 
 
The End of the Civil Wars 
The Lomé peace-agreement was signed on July 7 1999 by the president Kabbah; RUF’s leader 
Sankoh and Koroma, the leader of the ‘sobels’, which marked the official end of the Sierra Leonean 
civil war (Fyle, 2006). As a part of the peace-agreement, a TRC was established. The peace-
agreement also marked the instalment of a UN peacekeeping mission, UNAMSIL, whose objective 
was to disarm rebel groups. However, combatants from the RUF rejected to do so and on 1 May 
2000, a splinter faction of the RUF took nearly 500 UN soldiers hostage, while the West Side Boys, 
another faction, abducted 10 British soldiers (Olonisakin, 2008). The international partners and the 
government saw the acts of the RUF and the West Side Boys as a violation to the Lomé Peace 
Agreement, and consequently, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was established in 2002, which 
opened up the possibility to prosecute the RUF combatants and collaborators for their actions after 
the Lomé agreement (Hayner, 2004) 8. 
In Liberia, the Special Court of Sierra Leone marked the end for Taylor, as the Court in March 2003 
approved the indictment of Charles Taylor on seventeen counts of war crimes, while the Liberian 
peace negotiations simultaneously were taking place in Accra, Ghana (Waugh, 2011: 270). Hoping 
that the Ghanaian hosts would arrest Taylor, the Office of the Prosecutor of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone unsealed an indictment against Taylor. However, Ghana refused to detain him and 
Taylor quickly returned to Monrovia (Cleaver & Massey, 2006: 183). However, the factions fighting 
against Taylor declared that they would only enter a cease-fire, if Taylor resigned as President. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 President Kabbah wrote to the UN that “[t]he purpose of such a court is to try and bring to credible justice those 
members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and their accomplices responsible for committing crimes against the 
people of Sierra Leone and for the taking of United Nations peacekeepers as hostages” (SLTRC, Vol.1, 2004:30). 
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Finally, Taylor accepted an ECOWAS arrangement providing him with asylum in Nigeria and 
resigned on 11 August 2003, wherefrom he was only handed over to Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’s unit in The Hague in 2006. Shortly after Taylor’s retraction, the Government of Liberia 
(excluding Taylor), LURD and MODEL signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra, 
Ghana in 2003, and a transitional interim government was installed (Hayner, 2007a). In October 
2003, the UN took over peacekeeping operations from ECOWAS and established the UN Mission in 
Liberia, UNMIL, with the military strength of 15,000 to promote stability (Cleaver & Massey, 2006: 
187). Before the CPA, Liberia saw seen seventeen peace agreements in the period of 1990-2003 
without success in promoting peace, given that all suffered from questionable political commitment 
(LITRC, vol. II, 2009: 159-160). 
 
The Birth of the Liberian & Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
Both the Sierra Leonean and Liberian TRCs were established on the basis of the two countries’ 
respective peace agreements, which provided the TRCs with their specific mandates. 
The 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement instructed the creation of a Liberian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission that was passed into law by the National Transitional Legislative 
Assembly in 2005 (LITRC Act, 2005). The work of the commission began in October 2005 with a 
timeline running from 2006-2009. Nine commissioners were appointed by the Head of the Interim 
Government, C. Gyude Bryant, and inaugurated by President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (LITRC, vol. II, 
2009: 26; 174). The commissioners represented different parts of Liberian society, and four of them 
were women, as agreed upon in the Act (LITRC Act, 2005). An independent panel led by the 
ECOWAS presented a list of fifteen potential candidates to the transitional government, where the 
criteria for selection were that the commission should be impartial and representative of the diversity 
of Liberian society (James-Allen, Weah and Goodfriend, 2010: 6-7). According to the mandate in the 
Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (2005), the LITRC was to 
investigate Liberia’s history between 1979-2003 along with gross human rights violations (GHRV), 
violations of international humanitarian law and other specific forms of abuse committed during this 
time period. Furthermore, the LITRC was, inter alia, to provide a forum for addressing impunity as 
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well as creating a space for victims and perpetrators to share experiences (LITRC Act, 2005).  
The Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission was mandated through the Lomé Peace 
Agreement and established in 2000 through the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, which mandated 
that the commission should “(...) address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for 
both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of 
the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation” (SLTRC, vol. I, 2004: 24). Thus, 
the overall purpose of the SLTRC was two-folded, much in line with the South African commission, 
as on one side it intended “(…) to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of 
human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from 
the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement“ (SLTRC, vol.1, 
2004: 31). The other purpose was a compromise of four elements: “(…) to address impunity, to 
respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition 
of the violations and abuses suffered” (SLTRC, vol.1, 2004: 25). 
Three of the commissioners were appointed by the UN, while four were Sierra Leoneans, nominated 
by Sierra Leoneans and appointed by a mix of different interest groups9 (SLTRC, vol.1, 2004: 53). 
The SLTRC Act 2000 stated the basic functions of the commission’s work, namely to research: key 
events, causes, patterns of abuses and the parties responsible. Moreover, it was mandated by the TRC 
Act 2000 to hold sessions about the violations and abuses of the conflict by the victims and 
perpetrators and lastly to gather statements and additional information (SLTRC, vol.1, 2004: 23). 
Thus, the main purpose was, by identifying perpetrators and victims, to create an impartial record of 
the conflict and through that facilitate national reconciliation. Additionally, The SLTRC went abroad 
to collect statements from Sierra Leoneans living in other regions of the world. 
 
Working Processes 
During its time, the LITRC carried out interviews with over 800 primary sources at public and in-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “(…) a selection Panel of six persons representing the President, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, the Inter 
Religious Council, the National Forum for Human Rights and the National Commission for Democracy and Human 
Rights” (SLTRC, vol.1, 2004: 53). 
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camera hearings as well as more than 20.000 statements10 of which contained testimonies from more 
than 17.000 classified victims, witnesses and perpetrators in Liberia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, 
United Kingdom and the United States (LITRC, vol. II, 2009: 333). The LITRC was the first to 
include its country’s diaspora in the process of truth and reconciliation11.  
The SLTRC collected around 9000 statements and held 350 public hearings (Hayner, 2007b). 
Altogether, the SLTRC identified 40242 violations and 14995 victims. The public hearings were 
extremely time limited, as they started in April and ended in August 2003, which is why only 350 
hearings were held (Hayner, 2004).  
Additionally, Benetech, a California-based human rights organisation aided both the SLTRC and the 
LITRC in establishing analytical objectives as well as the setup and management of a database 
through which the information on human rights violations collected in the statements was processed. 
Consequently, Benetech produced as chapter conducting a statistical analysis on the basis of the 
database for both commissions, which can be found in the appendices, while selected parts are 
included the official reports (James-Allen, Weah and Goodfriend, 2010; SLTRC Benetech, 2004) 12. 
An important difference between the two commissions was that the LITRC could recommend 
amnesty, while the SLTRC was not given this mandate, as this had already been provided to the 
different parties through the Lomé Peace Agreement. However, the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
later retracted this amnesty (LITRC ACT, 2005).  
 
Recommendations of the Reports 
The LITRC's final report was published in 2009 and included a wide range of recommendations from 
prosecutions, to public sanctions as well as reparations for victims suffering under the various crimes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Throughout their reports, both the LITRC and the SLTRC state different numbers of statements taken and public 
hearings conducted. We have chosen the numbers, which seem to be stated most frequently. 
11 The report of the Liberian TRC’s Diaspora Project poses displacement as a defining feature of the Liberian civil wars. 
Around 780,000 Liberians were estimated to have been refugees and 500,000 internally displaced by the conflict’s end. 
Therefore, the LITRC carried out statement taking with refugees in the United States, the United Kingdom as well as 
Ghana (Dabo, 2012: 5-9). 
12 Benetech assisted the commissions in integrating their quantitative findings of the analyses based on the database of 
information from the collected statements. For more information, please see http://www.benetech.org. 
	   35	  
defined within the legal framework of LITRC. The report contains a large number of 
recommendations primarily directed towards the Liberian government, but also includes civil society 
and the international community. These are concerned with accountability, domestic criminal 
prosecutions, general public sanctions, economic crimes prosecutions, and reparations provided for 
the victims and a so-called “Palava Hut System” (LITRC, vol. II, 2009) 13. One of the most 
important recommendations was the establishment of an Extraordinary Tribunal and Domestic 
criminal court to ensure accountability, which was to prosecute 182 individuals for committing gross 
violations of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law, and egregious domestic 
crimes (LITRC, vol. II, 2009: 347-358). The LITRC also recommended that 38 perpetrators, who 
cooperated with the commission throughout its work, should to be granted amnesty for contributing 
to the report (ibid.). Finally, the commission further recommended that 49 individuals, including 
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, were to be subject to public sanctions in that they were to resign 
from public duty and be banned from public office for 30 years (LITRC, vol. II, 2009: 360-361)14.  
The SLTRC released the report “Witness to Truth: Report of The Sierra Leone Truth & 
Reconciliation Commission” in 2004, which happened after some delay due to the on-going conflict 
in the country (SLTRC vol. I, 2004). The SLTRC based their research on several key themes that 
would guide their investigation, which is also reflected in the way the final report is structured. The 
report’s recommendations corresponded well with the human rights discourse, as the commission 
recommended for Sierra Leone to protect human rights, enforce rule of law, provide better security, 
promote good governance and fight corruption (SLTRC, vol. II, 2004: 118 – 205).  Correspondingly, 
the SLTRC recommended that death penalty was to be abolished in Sierra Leone (SLTRC, vol. II, 
2004: 206). The commission also called for a new constitution that would be compatible with the 
country’s international obligation (SLTRC, vol. II, 2004: 140). The SLTRC recommended an 
establishment of a repatriation programme, which should be a tool for rebuilding national trust. The 
programme was launched in December 2008 and is still in operation (Mohamed Suma and Christian 
Correa, 2009). Notably, the SLTRC did not include any recommendations on prosecutions or 
amnesty, as this was not in the commission’s mandate (SLTRC Act, 2000). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  The “Palava Hut” system was recommended as a conflict resolution mechanism to foster national healing at the 
community level. It was supposed to function as an alternative mean to accountability and truth-telling in the local 
ethnic communities in Liberia (James-Allen, Weah and Goodfriend, 2010: 21). 
14 The LITRC also recommended the government to promote memorialization and further investigations into economic 
crimes (LITRC, vol. II, 2009). 
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Sub-conclusion 
Throughout this chapter it has become evident that Sierra Leone and Liberia have had similar 
conflict trajectories. In both countries, the collusion and conflicting interests of various factions have 
also exacerbated the conflicts. The two civil wars have been intertwined on several levels, as 
ECOMOG has been involved in both conflicts as a mean to stabilise the countries. Soldiers in the 
RUF were trained in Liberia by the NPFL and the two factions collaborated in an attack across the 
Guinean border. A few years after the peace agreement in Sierra Leone in 1999, a Special Court was 
established that indicted Charles Taylor on seventeen counts of war crimes, which was the beginning 
of the end for Charles Taylor’s rule in Liberia and the end of the second Liberian Civil War in 2003.   
The truth and reconciliation commissions were both established through the two countries’ 
respective peace agreements with somewhat similar mandates. However, a distinct difference was 
that the LITRC could put forward individuals recommended for prosecution as well as individuals 
recommended for the granting of amnesty, which was not a part of the SLTRC’s mandate. Yet, the 
two TRCs were both to record the violations of human rights abuses committed during the civil wars 
and were in this sense structured similarly, as both were set out to find the truth about what happened 
during past conflicts and through that process foster national reconciliation. However, as we will see 
in the following comparative analysis, the two commissions have functioned differently due to their 
distinct contexts, which have also led to different outcomes of the two TRCs. In the following 
chapter, we will begin our analysis with a comparison of the political compromises that shaped the 
SLTRC and the LITRC’s establishments and premises of their work.  
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Chapter IV: Truth and Commissions: A Product of Political 
Compromises  
Through the literature review and historical account of occurrences in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it 
has become evident that the contextual set-up of TRCs is often an outcome of political negotiations 
within peace settlements at the end of a conflict. Therefore, it is now relevant to compare the 
contexts of the two countries' peace negotiations; how the establishment of the TRCs came into place 
and the manner in which their respective mandates were constituted. This will enable an analysis of 
differences and commonalities in the frameworks of the LITRC and the SLTRC, and whether they 
were actually established on the basis of reconciliatory purposes. Additionally, one also needs to 
consider other transitional justice mechanisms present in the post-conflict countries, as the total 
composition of their presence will reflect the outcome of the peace settlements. 
A brief account of the peace settlements will be provided together with an analysis of the 
implications of these for the two commissions’ establishments. Altogether, the purpose of this 
chapter is to demonstrate how political realities at the end of the civil wars influenced the formation 
of the LITRC and SLTRC. In our analysis, we will see the TRCs as products of negotiations between 
different interests of political elites and faction leaders, and further explore how the concept of 
justice plays out in this context. 
 
Settling the Peace Agreements 
In 2003, the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed by the Government of Liberia 
(excluding Taylor) and the major faction groups, LURD and MODEL. The agreement covered a 
broad range of intended reforms, political commitments and demobilisation processes, and 
committed to a human rights inquiry through the establishment of a TRC (Hayner, 2007a: 5). The 
strong push for a peace agreement came from independent civil society groups, and the agreement 
was signed by the factions, who had claimed that they would only engage in peace negotiations if 
Charles Taylor stepped down as President (LITRC, vol. II, 2009: 169-172). Amadu Sesay argues that 
the most decisive element in the negotiations was the unexpected exile and thus absence of Charles 
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Taylor. Taylor’s exile shifted the outlook of the negotiations and was of clear significance for the 
establishment of a new National Transitional Government of Liberia, from which Taylor was to be 
excluded (Sesay, 2009: 46). It was evident that the indictment of Taylor to the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone was a major factor that enabled the negotiations. The exclusion of Taylor in the 
agreement on a transitional interim government played a major role for the outcome, which would 
certainly have been different if he had participated in the negotiations. Instead, the peace agreement, 
one can argue, primarily became a compromise between the government, the warring factions of 
LURD and MODEL and civil society (James-Allen, Aaron Weah and Goodfriend, 2010: 5; Hayner, 
2007a).  Although the granting of amnesty was not officially included in the peace agreement, the 
peace agreement stated nothing about parties that were to be prosecuted, as this was decided should 
be treated through the LITRC (LITRC Act, 2005). 
Somewhat similar to the case of Liberia, the Sierra Leonean peace agreement initially granted 
amnesty to all factions and their combatants and established the SLTRC as the most important 
transitional justice mechanism. As mentioned, the Lomé peace agreement was signed by the then 
president Kabbah; Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, and Koroma, who led the “Sobels’ (Fyle, 2006). 
Arguably, this could be why there was a focus on including the RUF in power sharing and why there 
was given full pardon to all factions (Lomé Peace Agreement, 1999). Specifically, the peace-accord 
ensured that no juridical or official action would be taken against members of RUF and other 
prominent factions, and it was even decided that the amnesty to was to include international actors, 
who had violated human rights in Sierra Leone during the civil war. Therefore, one can argue that 
the peace agreement provided all parties involved in the conflict since 1991 impunity. This condition 
was not positively regarded in the UN, and the special representative Francis Okelo remarked that 
the UN interpretation of what had played out in Sierra Leone were serious violations of international 
law. One could argue that in line with the peace settlements in Liberia, it was agreed that all the 
involved actors should not be held juridical responsible for their actions, which was a pretext for the 
nation to be able to heal. 
The establishment of the TRCs in Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrate how these institutions 
eventually came to constitute part of a political compromise, in which its mandate and questions of 
impunity or amnesty were also addressed. This is substantiated by Lanegran (2005), as accounted for 
in the literature review, who argues that TRCs basically are products of political negotiations. 
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However, the transitional justice set-up changed significantly in Sierra Leone, when the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone was established with the assistance of the UN, which implicitly led to the 
withdrawal of amnesty granted to certain factions. 
 
Accountability versus Amnesty 
In Liberia, a central question in the peace agreement was how to handle the issue of accountability, 
as all factions were responsible for human rights violations and other types of abuse, which is also 
described by the LITRC report: 
“Accountability and amnesty became contestable issues at the peace conference in a way no other 
previous conference or agreement had addressed. (…) A compromise at the Accra Conference was 
to proceed with the business of ending the conflict thus, deferring these matters to the future through 
the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)” (LITRC, vol. II, 2009: 171). 
The LITRC essentially made up a part of a political compromise between mainly the faction groups 
and civil society organisations. It is important to note, that some civil society representatives initially 
proposed a war crimes tribunal, while some of the factions also initially were demanding justice for 
the Taylor administration (Hayner, 2007a: 15). Yet, responsible for gross human rights violations 
themselves, the warring factions sought to avoid prosecution, which is why a TRC was arguably the 
only actual transitional justice mechanism being established in Liberia, along with a Security Sector 
Reform15:  
“The trade-off between a tribunal and a TRC seems to have been explicit in everyone’s minds. ‘We 
chose a TRC because we didn’t want a war crimes tribunal. A tribunal would be seen as witch-
hunting’, was a typical comment – in this case, from the military leader of one of the rebel factions. 
(…) The TRC became a very attractive option, because the dominant view of participants from civil 
society and political parties was for a war crimes court. The TRC was very attractive. You didn’t 
need a general amnesty, because the TRC would give you an amnesty, it was thought. There was a 
sense that it was clear: a tribunal means you’d be put away, but the TRC wouldn’t put you in jail. No 
one paid any attention to explaining what this meant. ’The agreement on a TRC effectively ended any 
discussion about amnesty, which had begun to be raised by the factions.” (Ibid.). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The Security Sector Reform primarily sought to reconstruct police, dissolve irregular security forces and reconstruct 
military and was employed by UNMIL (Reeve and Speare, 2010). 
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Priscilla Hayner (2007a) explains how amnesty was therefore not proposed or included in the final 
peace agreement by any warring factions, as anyone demanding amnesty would be perceived as a 
perpetrator, and amnesty could be provided to some extent through the establishment of a TRC. 
Although the LITRC, in its Act, was described as a medium through which impunity and justice 
could be discussed and uncovered, one can still claim that the TRC was a “light” outcome of peace 
negotiations presenting more restorative justice and not the type of retributive justice of a war crimes 
tribunal. 
In Sierra Leone, the overall transitional justice dynamics, and the way to address accountability, 
radically changed with UN’s facilitation of a Special Court in Sierra Leone in 2002, which had the 
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes dating from 1996 (Hayner, 2004).  Subsequently, this was an 
important turning point for the work of the SLTRC, as the establishment of the Special Court 
facilitated the prosecution of RUF combatants and collaborators for their actions after 1996. Soon 
hereafter, the amnesty granted, which basically provided combatants with impunity prior to the 
peace-agreement, was refuted, and the Special Court could prosecute all combatants, “who bore the 
greatest responsibilities during the civil war”, as it is stated (Hayner, 2004). With the establishment 
of this hybrid court, one could argue that this implicitly annulled the amnesty given in the Lomé 
agreement. Megan MacKenzie and Mohamed Sesay (2012) argue that the UN pushed for the Special 
Court to be created, and that it did so because the ‘moving forward’ norm inherent in the Lomé 
Peace Agreement was contradictory to the international normalised approach to national 
reconciliation, which was more focused on confronting the conflict. It is difficult from the material at 
hand to conclude that there is a dichotomy between local norms in the SLTRC and international 
norms, as TRCs in general can be said to be based on an internationally normalised way of 
confronting the past. However, it is important to notice that, as also observed by Mackenzie and 
Sesay, that the hostage taking of 500 UN peacekeepers by the RUF in 2000, after the peace accord, 
was an embarrassing defeat of the UN (Mackenzie & Sesay, 2012). On the backdrop of this event, 
the UN’s interest in setting up a court that could hold the RUF and other faction groups accountable 
arguably increased. 
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Justice through different Institutions  
The fact that some individuals were now being prosecuted, including Charles Taylor, meant that the 
SLTRC, opposite the LITRC, was not merely an instrument in the peace agreements for avoiding 
prosecution through the excuse of exploring the causes of the conflict and national reconciliation 
through a TRC process – now, impunity was addressed by other authorities as well. This provided 
the SLTRC with a different role than the LITRC, as it was working in conjunction with the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone. Previous commissioner of the SLTRC, William A. Schabas (2004) describes 
how truth commissions traditionally have been viewed as an alternative to criminal justice that “(…) 
sometimes only in an informal manner, obviates or at the very least suspends prosecutions” 
(Schabas, 2004: 1088). However, Schabas claims that the coexistence of the two institutions in Sierra 
Leone demonstrates how justice in post-conflict societies needs to be approached through a “(...) 
complex mix of therapies” (ibid.), which the two bodies and the interaction between them to some 
extent address. In its mandate, the commission was able to explore subjects outside the jurisdictional 
limitations of the Court, such as historical events before the outbreak of conflict. The Special Court 
and SLTRC can clearly be viewed as “conjoined twins of justice” (Schabas, 2004), which 
complemented one another in working with transitional justice, in a mix of institutions which can be 
framed as “Hybrid Institutions” (George Klay Kieh, 2005). Schabas argues that the example of Sierra 
Leone suggests that it is not unfeasible for the two institutions to work in a complementary manner 
(Schabas, 2004: 1098). However, it also can be argued to have blurred the distinction between the 
functions of the two bodies. 
In Liberia, there was minimal risk of court action as national courts were very weak and the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone only wanted to prosecute Charles Taylor and not other faction leaders from 
Liberia (Hayner, 2007a). It this sense it can be argued, that the conditions in the Liberian peace 
agreement, where the TRC was the only transitional justice mechanism, provided the factions with 
impunity. Paul James-Allen, Aaron Weah and Lizzie Goodfriend (2010) describes how the factions 
viewed the establishment a TRC as the only way to avoid prosecutions, given that the warring 
factions evidently sought to secure continuous participation in the Liberian transition and become 
part of the future political elite. Therefore, a TRC report could be applied as a mean to undermine 
prosecution, as long as no courts were set up:  
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“Although a majority of parties in the CPA negotiations perceived the TRC as an alternative to 
criminal prosecutions, many ordinary Liberians saw the TRC process as a precursor to criminal 
justice. The prospect of prosecutions was outlined in the TRC Act, which empowered the commission 
to make detailed recommendations on prosecutions.” (James-Allen, Weah & Goodfriend, 2010: 6). 
It becomes evident that the negotiating actors established the Liberian TRC as a pretext for wanting 
to disclose the whole truth about the conflict and obtain national reconciliation. The establishment of 
the LITRC serves different interests, as various actors from different segments have contradicting 
perceptions about what purposes the LITRC should have. Whereas ordinary Liberians view the 
LITRC as a mean to obtain justice in the long run, and perpetrators should eventually prosecuted, the 
ones who actually negotiated it coming into place, the factions, perceived the LITRC as a means for 
avoiding prosecution and thereby ensuring impunity. The specific context of the peace settlement 
and the factions' interests in impunity might also explain the fact that so far none of the 
recommendations made by LITRC in 2009 have been implemented by the Liberian Government 
(1847 Post, 2013). Additionally, no war crime courts have been set up since the end of the civil war, 
which suggests none of the individuals responsible for human rights violations have been prosecuted. 
This issue will be elaborated further in the comparison of outcomes and recommendations of the 
LITRC and SLTRC.   
The SLTRC could not offer perpetrators amnesty in return for full confession, which is in contrast to 
the LITRC, where the commission did not endorse general amnesty, but perpetrators could still be 
recommended to the government to be granted amnesty, if they fully cooperated with the 
commission (LITRC, vol. II, 2009: 20). This was similar to that of the South African commission. 
One can argue that the Special Court might have resulted in fewer people confessing before SLTRC 
due to uncertainty about the relation between the court and the SLTRC. Even though the SLTRC did 
not have the power to prosecute, the premise for the data-collection of the commissioners changed, 
as the functions of the Special Court and SLTRC became blurred. Thus, it becomes evident that the 
general transitional justice set-up is important to understand in terms of the limitations of TRCs in 
particular, as the fact that the two types of justice were conjoined made it difficult to distinguish the 
two institutions. 
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Sub-conclusion 
In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, a TRC was initially set up as the primary transitional justice 
mechanism, along with providing full amnesty in Sierra Leone to all previous factions and 
combatants, while the factions avoided prosecution in Liberia through the establishment of a 
commission16. In this sense, one can argue that the initial outcomes of the peace agreements to some 
extent were quite similar, despite official differences in their contents. However, their contexts in 
relation to justice diverged significantly, when the UN assisted the set-up of the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone, which exercised retributive justice. Although the combination of the SLTRC and 
Special Court might have been effective, it could also be problematic for the work of the 
commission, given that the line between the two TJ bodies’ functions became blurred. Contrastingly, 
the LITRC became the only forum in Liberia through which impunity was to be addressed, which 
seems paradoxical, given that it was established in the first place for warring factions to avoid 
prosecution. 
It becomes evident from this section that one needs to interpret not only the context in which the 
TRCs are established, but also the function of a truth and reconciliation commission in relation to 
other transitional justice mechanisms. This is given that the coexistence of these different bodies 
inevitably will influence the working spheres of one another. Thus, they must be comprehended as 
complementary in the quest for justice.  
We will continue the comparison with a chapter dedicated to investigate how the two commissions 
sought to find the conflict patterns and the related issues attached to this exercise. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 It is important to note that the warring factions in Liberia were not granted amnesty, given that blanket amnesty would 
have been completely unacceptable to the public. Therefore, the question about amnesty was never up for official debate 
at the peace negotiations, but avoiding prosecution was rather ensured through the establishment of a TRC, and not a 
criminal court (Hayner, 2007a). 
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Chapter V: The Complexity of Classifying Violations, Victims and 
Perpetrators 
In this section, the LITRC’s and the SLTRC’s approaches to quantifying qualitative material from 
statements are explored. The statements were one of the ways in which the commissions could 
collect and, through a systematic process of coding the information, extract “reality” and thus 
uncover the truth about violent occurrences during the two civil wars. The following section will, on 
the basis of the views provided by Lars Buur (2001) and Richard A. Wilson (2001) in the literature 
review, point to the strong complexity of classifying violations, victims and perpetrators and the 
potential pitfalls that associated with this quantitative practice. Given that the set-up of the South 
African commission has inspired the SLTRC and LITRC, one can argue that examining and 
comparing the same issues in these two cases is meaningful. Therefore, the two commissions’ 
methodological approaches to condensing qualitative statements into quantitative data are assessed. 
Furthermore, we will discuss how the LITRC and the SLTRC are approaching the quest of finding 
“truth”. 
 
Processing Data 
Both the TRCs of Sierra Leone and Liberia describe how they processed large amounts of statements 
into material, which should be interpreted in uniform manner. Therefore, a system was to enable the 
staff to classify violations, victims and perpetrators in exactly the same way (LITRC Benetech, 2009:  
53; SLTRC, vol. I, 2004:170). This was done through a process coding, where ‘countable units’ were 
identified in the statements and transcribed into coding forms, which allegedly would enable the 
commissions to analyse human rights violations (ibid). The SLTRC coded approximately 9000 
statements by using the Human Rights Information Management system “Who did What to 
Whom”17 (SLTRC, vol. 1, 2004: 170 – 180; LITRC Benetech, 2009). Liberia applied the same 
Human Rights Information Management system as Sierra Leone to code approximately 17000 
statements for its analysis. Notably, this system had previously been applied in the South African 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Patrick Ball: ‘Who did What to Whom’, accessible through http://shr.aaas.org/Ball/contents.html. 
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TRC, which suggests that both commissions were inspired by best practices of the SATRC (SATRC, 
vol. I, 2004: 158-164). 
Both the SLTRC and the LITRC developed, in accordance with the procedure of the information 
management system, a so-called “controlled vocabulary” of violations, through which they would 
code all statements by counting the units in the statements that corresponded with the controlled 
vocabulary’s categories of violations. Thus, the unit of analysis for each record is the violation, 
which means that this defines the coding of elements in a statement. In this sense, one can argue that 
the coding through the human rights information management system serves the same purpose in the 
LITRC and the SLTRC. As observed, all seventeen categories of the controlled vocabulary as 
identified in the Sierra Leonean case18 are included in the identified categories of Liberia19. The 
LITRC has expanded their controlled vocabulary with additional six categories. The significantly 
higher number of statements collected can possibly explain this, representing a greater diversity in 
experiences. Buur argued in the case of South Africa’s TRC that the classification of statements into 
victims, perpetrators and violations produce certain materials cleaned of ambiguities for the script of 
a new national history. As the LITRC and the SLTRC employed the same quantitative methods as 
the SATRC, it can be argued that they fell into the same pitfall as the SATRC.  Buur draws up the 
issue of how statements of relevant and irrelevant truths were processed by stating that if the cases 
were not proper for the categorisations in the SATRC's human rights scheme, they were rejected 
(Buur, 2001:162). The information from the statements had to fit into the classification schema, the 
processing consequently reshapes the past in particular directions, as some types of violations and 
abuses were included, while others were not. The codings made by the SLTRC and LITRC can be 
argued to create uniform categories of both violation types as well as actors involved in the specific 
incidents, respectively.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The SLTRC’s 17 types of violations: forced displacement, abduction, arbitrary detention, killing, destruction of 
property, assault/beating, looting of goods, physical torture, forced labour, extortion, rape, sexual abuse, amputation, 
forced recruitment, sexual slavery, drugging, forced Cannibalism (SLTRC Benetech, 2004:8). 
19 The LITRC’s 23 types of violations: forced displacement, killing, assault, abduction, looting, forced labor, property 
destruction, robbery, torture, arbitrary detention, rape, exposure/deprivation, sexual abuse, extortion, forced 
recruitment, missing, gang rape, sexual slavery, ingesting taboo item, cannibalism, drugging, multiple rape, and 
amputation (LITRC Benetech, 2009: 53).	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Interpreting Conflicts 
In both of the cases the coding led to a focus on extreme types of violence and reflects the focus on 
human rights violations, and not other more subtle or structural types of violence. In both 
commissions, the purpose of creating the categories, as mentioned above, was to cover perpetrators’ 
behaviours (SLTRC, vol. I, 2004: 172; LITRC Benetech, 2009: 62). However, the vocabularies 
cannot account for the motives behind each violation, which arguably can lead to oversimplified 
conclusions. Additionally, the following statement from the SLTRC reveals the complexity in 
classifying continuous violations according to countable units:  
“It was noted that a victim could suffer most violations more than once, with the obvious exception 
of killing. Therefore a counting rule was required to ensure that the coders would count violation 
repetitions consistently. Consider a victim who is being punched by one perpetrator. A second 
perpetrator then joins the attack, repeatedly kicking the victim. This event could be interpreted as 
either one assault by two perpetrators or, alternatively, as two assaults. With a counting rule that 
states that one sustained period of abuse counts as one violation, the example would count as one 
violation.” (SLTRC, vol. I, 2004: 172). 
The counting rule demonstrated above shows the ambiguity of measuring violence and human right 
violations, as it can be hard to determine what counts as one violation. One could ask: if a victim had 
experienced various types of abuses systematically during a period of time, although not constantly, 
would that then count as one violation? And would it make sense to juxtapose this to one specific 
incident, where a victim experienced one certain violation? The issue is that all information from the 
statements from both Sierra Leone and Liberia had to be classified in a quantifiable manner, which 
resulted in creating a fixed way of how to interpret the information from the statements. It has not 
been possible to gain access to the database system, through which the codings were made; however, 
one might still assume that information, which did not comply with the categories as defined in the 
controlled vocabulary, would not be registered. As a result, the process of managing conflict 
complexities is, more specifically, also a process where certain story from social reality is filtered 
and a process that determines how the conflicts are further analysed. Wilson coins this problem by 
arguing that: “(...) a statistical grid can selectively classify social reality and in turn shape how that 
social reality is analysed” (Wilson, 2001: 47). Wilson exemplifies the argument by stating that 
killings by shooting are all categorised identically without distinguishing between the motives of the 
action, which consequently disregards the purpose of pulling the trigger (ibid). 
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Supposedly, the codes for violations should leave no room for subjective interpretation by statement 
takers or doubts of what acts should be classified as what type of violations and which should be 
excluded, as argued previously by both commissions. However, one can argue that individual 
statements, which are necessarily subjective, are not simple to classify due to nuances and possibly 
inconsistencies. Therefore, one can claim that an interpretation in the processing of statements is 
inevitable. In the case of Sierra Leone, the SLTRC even addresses this issue itself and raises doubts 
about what kinds of violations should be included in the coding. Not all violence is included, as 
violence not related to the armed conflict will be excluded. This opens up for questioning how one 
can decide whether violence is conflict-related or not – a question which the commission approaches 
as: 
“(…) the line between violations and abuses in general and those related to the armed conflict is not 
always an easy one to trace. It therefore seemed safe for the Commission to presume that violations 
and abuses committed in this period within Sierra Leone probably have some sort of relationship 
with the armed conflict. At the onset of the Commission’s work, statement takers were instructed to 
record information of violations and abuses that might not initially appear to be related to the armed 
conflict. Subsequently, any doubtful allegations have been considered by the Commission, and either 
included or excluded on a case by case basis.” (SLTRC vol.1, 2004: 42) 
Evidently, the type of violence counted as conflict-related, is not well defined. On one side, it can be 
argued that it leads to a broader inclusion of different realities from the conflict, as the SLTRC do. 
However, it can also be said to create room for interpreting what is conflict-related violence, and thus 
what is suitable for coding, and what is not – a room that is not described in the methodology of the 
report, and which leaves it up to the SLTRC staff to interpret the concept ‘conflict-related’ on a case 
to case basis, including some realities while excluding others in the statistical analysis of violations. 
In the LITRC’s report, the commission state that they distinguish between different types of conflict. 
As a result they separate armed conflict from armed violence. After a longer account on how they do 
this through international law, the reports conclude by stating that the lines between the two are 
blurred (LITRC, vol. II, 2009: 52-53). What is conflict related violence and what is not still stands as 
contested and thus opens for a space for large degree of interpretation. 
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Linking Perpetrator with Faction Groups 
In the SLTRC as well as in the case of the LITRC, the coding determines perpetrators according to 
their faction group, which reflects the narrative of the two reports, where the factions were concluded 
to be the perpetrators with the most responsibility for the atrocities (LITRC, vol. II, 2009: 248-251; 
SLTRC, vol. II, 2004: 38). This demonstrates the foundational purpose of identifying human rights 
violations, namely that it aims at identifying the perpetrators and the victims according to what 
violation was committed. Linking perpetrators with factions is one of the more fundamental issues 
for the commissions, because, as seen in the historical review of the two conflict histories, 
understanding the nature of the factions group is, if not impossible, an extremely complex task. The 
factions were constantly reshaped and two faction groups could be cooperating at one point and be in 
conflict soon hereafter. Additionally, the chain of command for many of the factions was often 
uncertain, which resulted in an anarchic environment (Dabo, 2012). This indicates that it is very 
complex to determine who belongs to which faction group and which faction group is which. As 
previously explained, the term sobels from the Sierra Leonean context illustrates the changing roles 
of the members of the faction groups well. The SLTRC assistance group, Benetech, noticed this 
problem as well and states further that there is a negative bias against the RUF: “in terms of dress 
and behaviour, the RUF and AFRC fighters were virtually indistinguishable; both had very ready 
access to SLA uniforms but commonly combined military fatigues with civilian clothing” (SLTRC 
Benetech, 2004: 22-23). 
 
Pattern-finders 
The LITRC and the SLTRC strived hard to argue for the strengths of their quantitative approach for 
processing the statements. The LITRC stated: “A quantitative analysis (…) can identify patterns and 
trends of violations experienced or perpetrated by the statement-givers collectively (…) [and] 
magnify the voices of victims and provide a body of empirical data that can help in processes of 
acknowledgement, accountability, understanding” (LITRC Benetech, 2009: 4). Simultaneously, the 
LITRC acknowledged that it is impossible to classify and thereby assert that the nature of their 
conflicts can be simply coded and made into a uniform report: “It is important to remember that the 
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data in this report only represent the data given to the TRC by individual statement-givers (…) these 
data do not necessarily represent the patterns of violence in Liberia as a whole” (LITRC Benetech, 
2009: 4). It is worth mentioning that the latter statement is only to be found in an appendix by 
Benetech, but nowhere in the official report. This apparent contradiction reveals how there is a gap 
between the commissions actually acknowledging the pitfalls of the quantitative exercise with the 
statements, while at the same time not accounting sufficiently for this in the official report. The 
SLTRC made a similar observation as they noticed that they sought to: “(…) allow a statistical 
analysis of the statements in order to identify trends and patterns” (SLTRC, Vol. I, 2004: 170). In 
continuation hereof the commission argued that samples of violations through statements that could 
work to show the general spread of violations in such a way that: “(…) many people could relate to 
the narratives and the experiences told by those who testified before the Commission” (SLTRC, vol. 
I, 2004: 143).  
Both of the commissions recognised that they cannot produce the whole truth by scaling up the 
statements collected. Instead, the commissions were producing patterns that can be recognised by the 
public. As the statements were subjective perceptions of the conflicts they cannot be said to be the 
truth but rather they were, by being organised through the ‘controlled vocabulary’, selectively chosen 
memorised narratives of the conflict. This is substantiated by the argument by Posel, who states that: 
“the engagement with the past will need to be acknowledged and accommodate the centrality of 
individual memory in the production of historical narratives” (Posel, 2008: 128). This means that, 
although the commissions were mandated to record an impartial history of the conflicts and that the 
commissions, especially the SLTRC, acknowledged that this aim can never be fully satisfied. What 
this means is that the commissions cannot function as actual truth-finders. However, they can 
arguably be said to be pattern-finders, which can identify patterns of human right violations that are 
recognisable to the broad public of the two countries. This identification, one can argue, might also 
serve a higher purpose in terms on produce a narrative that will induce a certain political culture built 
on a human rights discourse, which success and achievability nevertheless can be questioned.  
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Sub-conclusion 
Evidently, the set-up of SLTRC and LITRC in terms of performing a quantitative analysis of 
statements is quite similar, as they apply the same quantitative method for classification of 
violations, victims and perpetrators. This suggests that the SATRC model serve as template to carry 
out such exercises. By using similar techniques for classifying violations, victims and perpetrators, 
the SLTRC and the LITRC face the same potential pitfalls attached to the coding, which lie in the 
risk of setting categorisations that are too simplified and exclude nuances in statements. As 
demonstrated, the coding process might not be able to catch nuances and subjectivities in the 
statements, which, as a consequence of processing, become a uniform categorisation of type of 
violations, victims and perpetrators. One can argue that the SLTRC and LITRC, through their 
coding, also produced a selective “truth” based on certain violations in the past civil wars. This is 
visible through their identical categories for types of violations. Furthermore, as the violations are the 
central units in both cases, there is inherent desire to determine who the victims and perpetrators are, 
which is, if not unachievable, then close to. With this in mind, the process of identifying violations, 
victims and perpetrators cannot be a truth finding mission, but rather a process that selectively 
extracts some information, which is scaled up to, supposedly, common recognised narratives. 
In the next chapter, we will scrutinise and compare the two TRCs’ public hearings in terms of their 
purposes and the way they were used in praxis. This will enable us together with this chapter to 
better understand the working processes of the two commissions. 
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Chapter VI: Public Hearings: A Place for Remorse, Forgiving and 
Forgetting 
In this part, we will compare how the public hearings, arranged by the TRCs of Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, played out as well as the official purposes of these. Firstly, the set-ups of the hearings are 
described. In continuation hereof, we will analyse the official purposes of the hearings and, through 
ethnographic material and transcripts from the hearings, investigate the more specific individual 
purposes of those who attended these hearings. Lastly, we will discuss the friction between official 
purposes of reconciliation and the way in which the hearings actually played out in the two cases. 
This will allow us to analyse the public hearings, which we have identified as part of the two TRCs’ 
processes of promoting national reconciliation. A comparison of the process in the two cases should 
enable us to not only find differences, but also to identify broader patterns of how reconciliation 
processes are employed in the public hearings.  
 
Setting up the Public Hearings 
Sierra Leone and Liberia’s two TRCs carried out public hearings that in both countries were 
followed by the media. The hearings were set in place primarily for the witnesses to tell their stories 
and though those processes share their experiences. The reconciliatory idea of these hearings also 
provided room for victims and perpetrators to meet in private (SLTRC, vol. I, 2004: 182, LITRC, 
Vol. II, 2009: 188-189). In this sense, both the Liberian and the Sierra Leonean TRC argued that the 
purpose of the public hearings was to function as a process of social healing, as phrased by Minow 
(1998), and through that rebuild the nation. The public hearings can thus be a model of truth telling 
that gives space for remembering the conflicts and produce a collective memory and thus be a “(...) 
catalyst in promoting significant deterrent to future misconduct” (Landsman, 1996: 92). The 
foundational idea was thus, in line with the SATRC as shown in the literature review, to create 
reconciliation through truth telling. However, as will be demonstrated in the following, these 
prominent ideas of truth telling did not comply with the local realities and needs in neither Sierra 
Leone nor Liberia.  
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It was no easy task for the SLTRC to carry out the hearings. Firstly, the initial hearings in Freetown 
had a low attendance rate and it was only when high profiled individuals gave testimonies that 
people attended (SLTRC, vol. I, 2004: 97-99). Secondly, the SLTRC struggled to find witnesses who 
were willing to give testimonies; there was a “(...) daily process of replacing witnesses and looking 
for new ones” (ibid).  One can argue that this suggests that the willingness of re-opening and 
remembering the conflicts was not as appreciated by the public as it was by the SLTRC. This could 
also be because people were afraid of retaliation due to the quasi-judicial view on the commission, 
meaning that people were uncertain about whether they could be held legally accountable for their 
statements in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, as expressed by Schabas (2004). 
The LITRC’s public hearings began in January 2008 and concluded sixteen months later. The 
LITRC framed the hearings as an opportunity for victims and perpetrators to have their experiences 
officially heard by the state and acknowledged as a part of the Liberian experience (LITRC, vol. II, 
2009: 188-190). Even though the LITRC had subpoena powers to make individuals testify, it never 
used the power. On a voluntarily basis, the LITRC managed to bring the most of the main 
perpetrators to the public hearings, except Charles Taylor, who remained in custody in The Hague 
(Weah, 2012: 8). This is contrary to the SLTRC, who eventually issued subpoenas against five 
serving ministers as well as leaders of government institutions; the Attorney General, and the 
chairman and secretary of the ruling political party (SLTRC, vol. I, 2004: 97). This could indicate 
that the lack of judicial powers in the larger transitional justice landscape in Liberia had an effect on 
the willingness of alleged perpetrators to participate.  
 
Politicised Reconciliation  
As can be observed at this point, the alleged perpetrators were reluctant to appear in the hearings, 
and one can thus question the reconciliatory function of these hearings. Although the hearings were 
thought to serve as a way for national reconciliation and social healing, not all people were equally 
willing to participate in these processes, as stated above. In Sierra Leone, Strasser, the leader of the 
military rule in the 1990s, compelled to testify. The SLTRC report stated that different politicians 
and officials were operating against the commission, which complicated its work (SLTRC, Vol. I, 
2004: 97 – 99). In this light, it becomes clear that the public hearings were more than simply a 
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process of social healing, as the hearings also became politically contested and negotiated. The 
following example from the SLTRC report demonstrates this point: President Kabbah was asked, in 
a thematically hearing, if he would use the opportunity to acknowledge the wrongdoings of all 
parties, including the government, and through that foster reconciliation. He answered rather 
furiously: “(...) I went around this country telling people, please I beg you, wrongs that have been 
done one way or the other, accept what it is, just forget about the past... Let’s live together; let’s 
work together and rebuild our country” (SLTRC, Vol. III, 2004: 485). The answer to the 
commission from Kabbah shows that he welcomed the idea of reconciliation, however he strongly 
suggested that this should be achieved through forgetting rather than remembering. Kabbahs 
proposal for people to forget and move on does not comply with the truth telling practice as 
presented by the SLTRC. Additionally, the fact that Kabbah refused to comment on the 
government’s wrongdoings and thereby refused to show remorse also went against the original 
intension of the hearing.  
The Liberian experiences with public hearings shows, similarly, that not only were the actual 
hearings politicised, but so were the discourses surrounding the hearings. The LITRC launched the 
first hearings in the same period, as when the trials in The Hague against Charles Taylor for his role 
in the Sierra Leonean civil war started. The Liberian public’s attentions were to a larger degree on 
the trials in The Hague. Furthermore, several critics voiced that the hearings could not create genuine 
reconciliation (Gberie, 2008). When the media covered the hearings, it was mostly with a focus on 
the internal politics of the commission and the controversies among the commissioners (Dabo, 2012: 
11).  
Evidently, the public hearings can serve as more than merely a mean to foster reconciliation and as a 
truth telling practice. Both in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean, although through different examples, 
where the public hearings object for political contestation and debate. 
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Different Motives for Participating in Public Hearings 
Although both the SLTRC and LITRC’s original purpose of carrying out public hearings was to 
foster national reconciliation through the sharing of experiences and confessions, the motives of the 
individuals providing the testimonies strongly diverged from this intension. 
A significant proportion of the people giving testimonies were concerned about their personal 
everyday situation and not as much the quest of telling the truth. It is important to notice that this is 
not the expression in all the reviewed examples. However, when the statement-givers were given the 
opportunity to give recommendations, they were often addressing everyday problems and not 
reconciliatory ones. Thus, truth telling is not simply a mechanism through which the individual can 
restore their dignities and the nation can find the truth about their past, but also a place where the 
people address their problems about their current living situation. It was common in the Sierra 
Leonean case to call for help in local communities, as the following quote from the one of the 
hearings illustrate: 
“In our village, Manokotohun, we have no school. Our children want to be educated, we conduct 
school session in a hut; during the rains there is no School. The road leading to our village is 
destroyed, we need Constructions of new roads; in upper Nongowa chiefdom we need a secondary 
school; this has led to a lot of school dropouts. I am appealing to the government of Tejan Kabbah, 
to assist lactating mothers to educate our children; if they were educated there would have been no 
war. All of us in Mambu street, our houses were destroyed; we are appealing to the government for 
the reconstruction of our houses; the women are appealing for micro credit facilities in our 
chiefdom” (SLTRC appendix3b, 2004: 826). 
This not only demonstrates that the public hearings can be a place, where people can address 
problems about their current living situations, but also that public hearings is a space where people 
appeal to the Sierra Leonean central government for political initiatives in the specific communities. 
This type of enquiry to the central government is not the only way in which people would address 
problems from their everyday life. More commonly, people addressed personal problems in the 
public hearings, such as: “(...) my father is poor and finds it very difficult to maintain me in school. 
Even in the area of lunch my friends help out; sometimes I do not even have books” (SLTRC 
Appendix3b, 2004: 748).  
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In Liberia, another motive for participating in the public hearings was the quest for perpetrators to 
gain amnesty by cooperating with the LITRC. Aaron Weah (2003) describes how the public hearings 
were dominated by former perpetrators, who sought a “happy ending” through the granting of 
amnesty (Weah, 2012: 5-9)20. The LITRC expected that the hearings would lead to full truth 
disclosure and that “(…) remorse would be shown for the victimisation of thousands through 
apologies for the wrongs done and a commitment to “never again” commit atrocities” (Weah, 2012: 
6). However, this was not always the case. Some perpetrators used the hearings to threaten with 
instability, if they were recommended for prosecution, and in this sense one can argue that the 
presence and participation of some perpetrators might have caused more division and indignation 
rather than reconciliation (Weah, 2012: 7). This was different in the case of Sierra Leone’s TRC, 
where perpetrators were much more reluctant to testify and some were even subpoenaed to enter 
before the commission. The reason for this difference might be the fact that the LITRC, as 
mentioned, was able to recommend amnesty to individuals making full disclosures of their wrongs 
and thereby allegedly expressing remorse for their acts, which clearly distinguished it from the 
SLTRC. The SLTRC did not offer amnesty in exchange for “truth” (LITRC Act, 2005; SLTRC Act, 
2000). One could claim that the amnesty-for-truth idea worked as an incentive for perpetrators to 
step forward, because they in this sense could use the LITRC as a way to obtain impunity. 
 
The Art of showing Remorse 
In the following, it will be demonstrated how alleged perpetrators showed remorse as a tactic to be 
granted amnesty in the case of LITRC. An example of this was the testimony of Joshua Blahyi, a 
former faction fighter for the ULIMO-J faction and later leader of the Butt Naked Brigade, a squad 
of naked child fighters, who thought that nudity protected them from bullets (Gberie, 2008: 458). 
Blahyi was responsible for the deaths of 20,000 people during the war, but shortly after the end of 
the second Liberian civil war he became a newborn Christian and claimed that his testimony before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 It is important to note that when the LITRC’s final report was released, only 38 individuals, of all the perpetrators 
cooperating the commission, were not recommended for prosecution. This was given that the TRC Act gave the 
commission the power to recommend amnesty, but strongly prohibited amnesty for violations of humanitarian law and 
crimes against humanity (LITRC Act, 2005). Therefore, the number of people not recommended for prosecution was 
surprisingly low, which caused a great reaction in the response to the final report. This will be further elaborated in the 
section on the outcome of the commissions’ work. 
	   56	  
the LITRC served the purpose of contrition. When asked for a final remark at the hearing, he stated 
the following: 
”First I want to say thank you and that there are some of you that will be embarrassed by our 
presence, but logically if a man and another got into conflict and the other one mind is telling him 
that he is wrong and he will be asking for forgiveness, and the victims may not want peaceful 
settlement and want a revenge, then the one who wants peaceful settlement is more of a victim then 
perpetrator, (…) please forgive us and don't be deterred by our presence I have been called by 
Christ and called you people champions and I will always be coming so that you can advise me on 
how to go forward so that the process will not be hampered. To the public I say I am sorry and not to 
compensate you but my wife and family have decided that the proceed from the book I have written 
will be kept in an account to help people that have problem to redeem them. And to you that came 
here to listen to someone like me, I want to say thank you and that this process will achieve its goal 
to this nation. Thank you sir.” (LITRC transcript VII, 2008). 
Evidently, the testimony in itself is to some extent theatrical, as also argued by Lansana Gberie 
(2008), and it demonstrates how Blahyi strongly attempted to gain full sympathy of the spectators, 
and not least of the LITRC. Interestingly, the LITRC eventually in their final report recommended 
full amnesty to Blahyi for his cooperation. In this sense, the act of showing remorse becomes more 
important than the actual truth about his actions. This also corresponds well with Buur’s argument 
that the hearing of perpetrators and signs of remorse clearly demonstrate a shift in power from 
perpetrators to victims, from one class and social group to another. 
Several scholars have noticed that remorse was also an often expressed emotion in the case of Sierra 
Leone. Tim Kelsall (2005), who attended some of the Sierra Leonean hearings, observed that the 
hearings were staged ceremonies where half-truths and lies were told. He argues that the idea of truth 
telling lacks roots in the cultures of Sierra Leone and that the Sierra Leoneans instead wanted to 
forget as a way to move forward. More precisely, he concludes from his observations that the truths 
of the atrocities were overshadowed by spectators’ greater concern of seeing signs of true remorse 
(Kelsall, 2005). Kelsall’s observations shows that the truth telling practice as a way to create 
reconciliation is, when it meets local realities, transformed into i.e. desires to see remorse: “(…) the 
unbearable truth of atrocities was partially eclipsed by the more palatable truth of remorse and 
desires for peace.” (Kelsall, 2005: 390).  
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In both of the cases, the TRCs idea of public hearings did not simply create a process of 
reconciliation through truth telling, but rather they created a ritual ceremony, where expressions of 
remorse were desired both by spectators and the alleged perpetrators. This, however, does not mean 
that reconciliation through public hearings are not obtainable; rather it implies that the idea of truth 
telling is transformed as people were more interested in “moving on” as a way of creating peace. The 
argument about different statement givers using the public hearings as a platform for achieving other 
purposes than that of truth telling fits well with the argument of Roselyn Shaw. Shaw states that most 
of her informants in Sierra Leone thought that the path to reconciliation should be reached through 
forgetting rather than truth telling (Shaw, 2007). This could be an explanation to why the public 
hearings in both countries took a theatrical shape and focused more on showing remorse rather than 
telling the truth.  
 
Sub-conclusion 
We have discovered how statements givers had various and, at times, conflicting motives for 
testifying before the commissions, which was evident in both cases. Moreover, the intensions of 
statements givers diverged from those of the LITRC and SLTRC, which meant that the actual 
purpose of the hearings, discovering the truth and through that reconciling the population, were 
modified when they met local ideas of “moving on”. However, we do not claim that the motives of 
statement givers for testifying before the two commissions were identical.  Rather, we can merely 
observe that people used the hearings for various purposes and often as a mean for addressing 
personal problems. Remorse in the two cases was important, as the spectators were more interested 
in seeing remorse than telling and finding the truth as such. This suggests that remorse was another 
way through which justice could be addressed. 
Additionally, the context of the commissions influenced people’s willingness to testify, where 
perpetrators in Sierra Leone were reluctant due to fears of being prosecuted, while in Liberia, the 
they were more willing to testify as it could potentially exempt them from prosecution. In this sense, 
the possibility for gaining amnesty through collaborating with the commissions should be 
considered. The fact that the SLTRC could not offer perpetrators the recommendation of exemption 
of prosecution in return for cooperation, while the LITRC could, changes the motives for testifying. 
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This leads us to the last analytical chapter in the comparison, which will examine the 
recommendations and the reception of these. 
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Chapter VII: Responses to the Final Recommendations  
In this chapter, we wish to compare and discuss the follow-up and not least the responses to the 
commissions’ reports, which contained a number of controversial recommendations. As 
demonstrated in the literature review and further explored in the first analytical chapter, the LITRC 
and the SLTRC should be understood by viewing the specific political contexts in which they were 
established. Therefore, we wish to analyse how the political elites and the public in both countries 
responded to the reports, and how the follow-up on recommendations – or lack hereof – has played 
out. We will discuss whether the commissions and their recommendations actually managed to 
promote national reconciliation and contribute to a sense of justice on a national level, or if they have 
merely reemphasised deep-rooted issues in the two countries. 
 
Politicised Recommendations 
Six years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, the LITRC released its report with 
recommendations for the Liberian government, civil society and the international community. Its 
recommendations were extensive, and the ones to the Liberian government were radical, as they 
reached far into the political elite. There has been much debate about why President Sirleaf were 
recommended to resign, given her financial support to Charles Taylor in 1990, while Joshua Blahyi, 
a former faction fighter responsible for 20.000 deaths, was granted amnesty for his cooperation with 
the commission (Weah, 2012). Furthermore, the commission recommended President Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf to step down, but also recommended 49 individuals to resign from public duty and to ban 
them from public offices for 30 years. Responses to the report have been quite mixed. Some of the 
public officials – who were former perpetrators and a part of the political elite at the time of the 
release – strongly objected the recommendations (Dabo, 2012: 14; see also Weah, 2012: 1-5). A 
group of government officials gathered under the banner: “Signatories to the Accra Comprehensive 
Peace Accord”, which consisted of former warring faction leaders. They threw a press conference 
that rejected the entire report and accused Jerome Verdier, chairman of the LITRC, for wanting to 
overthrow President Sirleaf. They claimed that any follow up on prosecutions would be a threat to 
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Liberia’s newfound stability (Weah, 2012: 5-6). Thus, the political elite in Liberia sought to, and still 
do, undermine making the findings of the report a political matter. Aaron Weah notices that: 
“[t]he present composition of postwar Liberia’s legislature does not inspire much hope, as some 
recently elected officials are former perpetrators who exploited the platform of the TRC’s public 
hearings and are now actively campaigning to shelve the Commission’s report” (Weah, 2012: 12).  
The recommendations have not been implemented although President Sirleaf on a few occasions has 
commented on them. Moreover, Weah states that the naming of names is problematic for 
recommendations on prosecutions and public sanctions, as the Liberian report does not provide any 
preceding explanation in its narrative as to why some individuals are put in certain categories, while 
others are not (Weah, 2012: 10). This is also the observation of Allen, Weah and Goodfriend who 
claim that the: “(…) the lack of due process coupled with the lack of supporting information linking 
those on the lists with the violations or crimes they allegedly perpetrated, is exacerbated by the fact 
that the lists are presented without any explanation of the criteria and methodology used by the 
TRC” (Allen, Weah and Goodfriend, 2010: 16). It can thus be questioned to what extent the narrative 
produced by the LITRC can be commonly recognised and to what extent it can be said to be 
impartial, and whether the report failed to justify its recommendations. 
The reception of the recommendations produced by SLITRC was to some extent different. When the 
SLTRC released the final report in Sierra Leone in 2004, recommendations were at first well 
received by the RUF party and civil society in general. The government published a “white paper”, 
which addressed some of the recommendations of from the SLTRC report. However, John-Paul 
Allen (IRIN News, 2013b) has argued that the government only hand-picked some recommendations 
and did not set a time-line for when the they should be implemented. The government did, thus, not 
fully address the SLTRC’s recommendations. In 2007, the UN and Sierra Leone’s Human Rights 
Commission21, which acted as the follow-up commission, addressed the lack of implementation and 
thus further politicised the recommendations. Despite the establishment of a reparation programme 
in 2008, the actual implementation has been less successful. Additionally, in Sierra Leone, Schabas 
(2004) has argued that the recommendations were also too drastic and most of them not expected to 
be implemented.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Established in 2006 (Hayner, 2007b: 29). 
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Similar to Liberia, many of the recommendations have not yet been implemented in Sierra Leone. 
This is problematic given that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 legislatively binds 
the government to implement the recommendations that are directed to state bodies (SLTRC Act, 
2000: Section 17). The Sierra Leonean government has addressed the recommendations, however 
arguably not extensively enough, whereas the Liberian government has completely opposed any 
implementation of the LITRC recommendations. As we will discuss in the following, the political 
expression of these recommendations can have implications for reconciliation in each of the 
countries. 
 
Justice & the Significance of a Special Court 
The fact that there has been a Special Court present in Sierra Leone, while no courts have proceeded 
with prosecutions in Liberia, arguably plays a significant role for the two TRCs’ recommendations. 
The recommendations are far more person-oriented in the LITRC, with lists of individuals to be 
prosecuted, sanctioned or exempted from prosecution due to cooperation with the commission. 
Contrastingly, the SLTRC’s recommendations are much broader and are concerned with rule of law, 
human rights, good governance etc., and do not, in contrast to the LITRC, contain a list of 
individuals, who are recommended for prosecution. This distinct difference in the outcome of the 
two reports should be understood in the relation to the presence of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone. The SLTRC are, in its recommendations, more focused on broader transitional justice issues 
which are concerned with human rights, reparations and so forth, and the recommendations has to be 
understood by regarding the SLTRC and Special Court as conjoined twins of justice (Schabas, 
2004). Whereas there is the Special Court in Sierra Leone can focus on retributive justice and the 
SLTRC can focus on restorative justice (SLTRC Act, 2000). Consequently, the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone convicted nine people, including Charles Taylor in 2012 for his involvement in the 
Sierra Leone civil war22. Interestingly, Charles Taylor has not been charged for any violations 
committed in Liberia (US Institute for Peace, 2013). The Special Court for Sierra Leone has in a 
symbolic manner demonstrated that justice is being addressed to some extent, which is not the case 
in Liberia. 
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On the contrary, the LITRC is the primary medium in through which justice and accountability for 
past human rights violations during the civil has been addressed, which might explain the 
commission’s recommendation to establish an Extraordinary Tribunal and Domestic Criminal Court 
as well as prosecuting 182 individuals, given that the LITRC’s mandate did not allow it fully address 
the issue of impunity in Liberia. The fact that there is no war tribunal in the country might 
complicate to what extent the LITRC recommendations can be fruitful for the creation of national 
reconciliation. Thus, it can be argued that it is more likely that a sense of justice and reconciliation 
can be introduced in Sierra Leone, whereas it also reflects that the LITRC’s recommendations will 
stand as untreated or as an attempt to undermine the central government. In either case, the question 
of justice is not fully answered. 
There have been various contradicting academic discussions concerning the impact of TRCs (see e.g. 
Hayner, 2001; Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne and Andrew G. Reiter, 2010 or Hunjoon Kim and 
Kathryn Sikkink, 2010). For instance, Olsen, Payne and Reiter (2010) have argued that truth 
commissions, when applied as the only transitional justice mechanism, have a significant negative 
effect on democracy and human rights, but if combined with courts that can proceed with trials, they 
can have a positive effect on the post-conflict society. This is a rather bold proposition, and it is not 
the intention here to substantiate (or disregard) the argument of Olsen, Payne and Reiter. However, it 
is important not to disregard other modes of addressing transitional justice than those of the TRCs 
and hybrid courts. 
While the implementation of the recommendations has been relatively slow in Sierra Leone, it is 
non-existing in Liberia. Shortly after the release of the LITRC’s final report, the Liberian Parliament 
postponed taking action on the recommendations, and stated that it would need to consult its 
constituent for approximately a year before deciding upon whether or not to implement the 
recommendations (Konneh, 2009). Additionally, in January 2011, the Liberian Supreme Court 
declared the LITRC’s recommendations on suspending 48 individuals from holding public office as 
unconstitutional (Schabas, 2011), which adds to the undermining of the LITRC’s work. One can 
argue that the establishment of a hybrid court, as in the case of Sierra Leone, would have provided a 
different outcome – not only in terms of LITRC’s recommendations, but also in the context of the 
more general management of justice and accountability after the civil wars. The prospect of a 
tribunal might have signified a new beginning, given that the prosecution of the civil war’s worst 
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perpetrators could renew the Liberian people’s faith in politics and greater optimism. For now, the 
report of the LITRC only: “ (…) deepens the wedge between governors and governed, reinforcing 
the view that politics is rotten, the public sphere an arena for liars, murderers, and cheats. It is hard to 
fathom how a country that feels that way about its political class will ever overcome the formidable 
challenges Liberia faces” (Steinberg, 2009: 144). 
 
Re-opening Old Wounds or Facilitating Reconciliation? 
The fact that the narrative and recommendations provided by the LITRCs are highly contested, 
suggests that the reconciliatory purposes of the commissions become rather ambiguous. If the 
Liberian public is backing up the findings of the report, while the political elite is distancing 
themselves from the same narrative; the report might instead create a gap between not only the 
public and the political elite, but also between victims and perpetrators, which does not associate 
reconciliation (Weah, 2012). Held together with the absence of jurisdictional mechanisms that can 
hold the identified perpetrators accountable, this gap can further re-open old conflicts and potentially 
re-wake conflict in Liberia. This connects with Weah’s argument that: “(...) as long as perpetrators 
remain unrepentant and the state indifferent to the fiefdom of impunity, uncertainty in post-TRC 
Liberia will threaten the gains made and undermine public trust.” (Weah, 2012: 13). Thus, the 
LITRC cannot simply, by producing a narrative, which is based on selective material, create 
reconciliation. The report’s recommendations will evidently be politically contested when it meets 
the reality of the political elite and public as various interests and perceptions of the conflicts are at 
stake. One could argue that if proper reconciliation should be obtained, there is a need for the 
perpetrators to be held accountable for their actions. As Steinberg argues:  
“If the political class rallies against the Final Report, and many ordinary people rally behind it, the 
popular dimension of the war will remain forever unconfronted. The elite can be scapegoated as the 
locus of evil, and ordinary people will never have to come to terms with the impulses that caused 
many among them to pillage and kill” (Steinberg, 2009: 144).  
The quote above illustrates the concern well, however only the future will tell to what extent the 
Liberians have reconciled. It is important to note that the differences in the recommendations also 
reflect the mandates of the two commissions. While the LITRC could make recommendations on 
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prosecutions in particular cases, as the TRC deemed appropriate as well as providing amnesty to 
perpetrators, who cooperated, the SLTRC was not given the mandate to either of these functions 
(LITRC Act, 2005; SLTRC Act, 2000). Nevertheless, the issue of the recommendations being too 
extensive suggests that they in both of the cases do not stand unchallenged. Rather, the 
recommendations become an object of political contestation. In this sense, one can question whether 
the reports actually have had a national reconciliatory effect? Or whether the TRCs merely promote 
reconciliation, especially if the recommendations are not implemented, but rather left for widespread 
public and political discussions? The latter question is specifically relevant in the case of Liberia, 
where none of the recommendations have been properly addressed. This could lead one to assume 
that the recommendations would lead to destabilisation of the precarious peace, as the 
recommendations merely reemphasise the tensions in the post-conflict countries.  
 
Sub-conclusion 
By the release of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean reports, the conflict wars have again become 
object for political contestation. By looking at the recommendations it becomes clear that they 
cannot stand uncontested due to their far-reaching determinations. Thus, the recommendations have 
opened a political battlefield in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, which corresponds well with 
Lanegran’s (2005) observations. Evidently, the SLTRC’s and LITRC’s reports and recommendations 
are contested in the their respective public spheres, and it becomes clear that reconciliation has not 
been promoted on a national level by the commissions, especially not in Liberia, where: “(…) since 
the publication of the draft report of the TRC (…) the West African state has been caught in a state 
of confusion and tension for a number of reasons” (Svärd, 2013). One of the main elements that 
differ is that the SLTRC can focus primarily on restorative justice, as the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone has the power to prosecute and thus focus on retributive justice. Contrastingly, no such court 
has been established in Liberia, which is why the LITRC attempts to address both retributive and 
restorative types of justice in its recommendations. However, in both of the cases the 
recommendations have to a low degree been implemented, which arguably could lead to new gaps 
between the political elite and the public. This is especially the case in Liberia, where the 
government has disregarded all the recommendations. Since the report and more specifically the 
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recommendations of the LITRC can be seen as a political expression that displays a “truth” about 
perpetrators within the elite, one can question the extent to which the LITRC have had a 
reconciliatory effect. In Sierra Leone the Special Court has shaped a different transitional justice 
landscape that arguably provides better conditions for addressing the question of justice than in 
Liberia. For instance, the recent conviction of Charles Taylor in The Hague arguably produces a 
symbolic break with the previous violent rule in Sierra Leone.  
This chapter marked the last comparative chapter in the analysis, and we will now proceed with the 
conclusion.  
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
As we initiated our project, we identified the three cross-cutting concepts of truth, justice and 
reconciliation, which became the focal points for comparing the truth and reconciliation 
commissions of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Through the literature review, we refined and concretised 
how we applied these concepts in the analysis, and after a chapter on the history of the civil wars and 
institutional set-up of the commissions we preceded with our comparison of the two cases. We will 
at the end of this conclusion revisit these three concepts in relation to our findings. Before doing so, 
we will clarify our main findings of the project by answering the three sub-questions chronologically 
and concluding with the research question. 
In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the end of the civil wars was marked by their respective peace-
agreement, signed by actors who were involved in the conflicts. As part of these agreements, the 
countries’ respective TRCs were established. Initially, the TRCs were the primary transitional justice 
bodies in both countries. There were differences in the way in which the commissions addressed the 
question of amnesty. The seemingly similar outcomes of the peace agreement in terms of the role 
that justice played in the two TRCs altered, when the Sierra Leonean government with assistance 
from the UN created the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which had the power to prosecute those 
bearing the greatest responsibilities. This significantly changed the role of the SLTRC and how they 
could address justice, as they were now not the only transitional justice mechanism in Sierra Leone. 
Thus, the balance between retributive and restorative justice was different than in Liberia, where the 
LITRC had to manage both “sides” of justice, as it was provided with a mandate to recommend 
prosecutions and amnesty. The promotion of reconciliation was therefore not approached in a 
uniform manner in the two countries, given that the ways in which the two TRCs worked with 
restorative justice was different. From this point, the political realities of the two countries gradually 
evolved in different directions, which resulted in that the larger transitional justice set-up, and 
therefore also the framework of the TRCs, also came to differ significantly.  
Secondly, we compared the methods employed by the Sierra Leonean and Liberian TRCs. By 
analysing the method applied for identifying conflict patterns we discovered that they made use of 
the same system for classifying victims, perpetrators and violations. Furthermore, we found that the 
two commissions based their analyses on the same model as employed by the South African TRC. 
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The fact that they used the same system became evident as we observed that both commissions 
focused on certain types of violence and not other. We assessed that the motives behind the 
violations could not be explained from such quantification. Consequently, we argued that both 
commissions risked falling into the same pitfalls that Buur and Wilson emphasised, namely that they 
would oversimplify the conflicts and produce a selective narrative. An objective truth about past 
events could thus not be created. Instead, the commission could rather seek to create a common 
narrative, which was, however, based on selective information. We also examined the public 
hearings as another side of their methods of promoting reconciliation, where we discovered that the 
hearings became a public arena, used by statement givers with various motives. Perpetrators in 
Liberia sought to gain amnesty by collaborating, while alleged perpetrators were more reluctant to 
collaborate in Sierra Leone, as some were afraid of prosecution. Interestingly, and in contrast to both 
of the TRC’s official purposes, statement givers used the hearings as a way of showing and seeing 
remorse. Whereas the official purpose was to promote national reconciliation through truth-telling, 
the participants in Sierra Leone preferred to see remorse as a tactic of forgetting and as a way to 
“move on”. This showed us that the intentional purpose did not comply with local customs of truth-
telling. Instead, the act of showing remorse could be a way to move on or a means of potentially 
being recommended amnesty. These two aspects of the methods utilised by the SLTRC and the 
LITRC reveal similarities in the ways that the two commissions used close to identical methods. In 
both cases, the way in which the public hearings were used in praxis differed from the official 
intention of these. This also showed us that the hearings were used differently in the two cases 
possibly due to the different functions of the LITRC and the SLTRC. 
Lastly, we compared the reception of the two commissions’ recommendations. In both of the 
countries, the receptions were mixed. Some have argued that this is due to the far-reaching nature of 
the recommendations, making them difficult to implement, especially because it would have 
negative, albeit different, consequences for the sitting governments in both countries. The manners in 
which the governments have responded to the recommendations varied in the two cases. In Liberia, 
none of the recommendations have been implemented, and observers state that the lack of action 
could lead to further tension and separation between the political elite and the public, which is not 
very helpful in promoting national reconciliation. In Sierra Leone the picture is different. Although 
the government has handpicked some of the recommendations for implementation, they have to a 
larger degree acknowledged the SLTRC’s work. However, from the comparison it becomes evident 
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that the recommendations do not stand as neutral statements but become politicised when they meet 
the public sphere.  
From these findings we can conclude that the concepts of truth, justice and reconciliation were 
deployed rather differently in the two cases. The formation of both TRCs was a product of a political 
compromise, which resulted in two different manners through which the TRCs could address justice. 
We also discovered that in both of the TRCs’ working processes, they did not to find the truth about 
past violations as such, although this was claimed to be the official objective. Instead, the 
commission could only manage to produce a selective narrative. In the hearings we discovered that 
finding truth was not even the primary desire of the attendants. Instead, reconciliation came to have a 
different significance in the local contexts. Additionally, the final recommendations showed us that 
the reports by no means stand as neutral statements. Instead, they became politically contested in 
varying degrees. The Liberian case demonstrated that the LITRC might actually have impeded 
reconciliation, whereas in Sierra Leone we saw signs of a more positive attitude towards 
reconciliation through the SLTRC’s work. This is also given the fact that justice to some extent 
remains unaddressed in Liberia, while Sierra Leone has taken the first few steps towards ensuring 
accountability. 
Thus, we can conclude that truth and reconciliation commissions have to be understood in 
accordance with their specific contexts, despite the fact that there seems to be an acknowledged 
template for forming TRCs. We have found that although the two commissions appeared to be 
similar cases, this does not imply that the concepts of truth, justice and reconciliation are deployed 
the same manner, when negotiated in national contexts. 
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